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The future of international lawmaking is in peril. Both trade and climate negotiationshave failed to produce a multilateral agreement since the mid-1990s, while the U.N. Security
Council has been unable to comprehensively respond to the humanitarian crisis in Sjyria. In
response to mullilateralism's retreat, many prominent commentators have called for
international institutions to be given the power to bind holdout states-often rising or reluctant
powers such as China and the United States-without their consent. In short, these proposals
envision international law traveling the road taken by federal systems such as the United States
and the European Union: from contractual lawmaking in which states are free to make
commitments to each other and free to decline commitments to which they object, to legislative
lawmaking in which states-through international institutions-make collective decisions
about what legal obligations to undertake.
In this Article, I argue that international legislatures-institutions such as the
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that
make collective deisions about the legal obligations that members may make to each other-
are already numerous. But international legislatures of the kind envisioned by global
government's proponents are unlikey to emege because the rise of international legislatures is
not driven by the desire to reduce the role of holdouts. To the contray, I contend that
legislatures exist to magnify the abiliy of holdouts to stall and even paralyze lawmaking.
Further, I ague that the increased importance of holdouts is, within limits, benefical for
international awmaking.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. For helpful comments on
earlier drafts, many thanks to Diane Amann, Kent Barnett, Dan Coenen, Harlan Cohen, Katerina
Linos, Joseph Miller, Kal Raustiala, Peter Rutledge, Anna Spain, Edward Swaine, Pierre-Hughes
Verdier, David Zaring and participants at the Annual Conference of the International Society for
New Institutional Economics, the Colorado-Wharton Junior Faculty Workshop, and the
University of Georgia Junior Faculty Retreat.
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In contractual lawmaking states are free to expel holdouts from negotiations and
make commitments among a smaller group of the willing. Moving from contract to legislation
removes this freedom. In the U.S. Congress, the minorioy's holdup power is created through
procedures such as the filibuster in the Senate and the committee system, under which a
proposal with majority support can nevertheless fail to obtain a floor vote due to the opposition
of a few key committee members. In international legislatures, this holdup power is created
chiefly through a process known as "adoption," which requires that an institution as a whole,
usually by consensus, approve an agreement before any individual member state can sign and
ratiy it. Adoption does not imply that member states will ratify5 or be bound by the agreement;
as with agreements like the Kyoto Protocol, some states that vote for adoption will not ratfi the
agreement. Instead, one of the adoption procedure's main effects is to empower states with no
intention ofjoining a treaty to nevertheless veto its enactment by cooperation-minded states.The increased holdup power created by legislatures is a feature, not a bug This holdup
power is beneficial because it allows states to enforce legislative bargains: deals in which a state
makes concessions in one negotiation in exchange for another state's concessions in a later
related negotiation. Such iterative negotiations-found in free trade talks, environmental
regimes, and efforts to establish a robust international criminal law--are a hallmark of
modern international lawmaking. Absent some enforcement mechanism, though, states would
be unwilling to "trade votes" across negotiations out of fear that otherparties would not uphold
their end of the bargain. International legislatures thus do not lubricate international
lawmaking by allowing states to be bound against their will. Quite the opposite, international
legislatures facilitate lawmaking by allowing states to stall lawmaking in the event that a
legislative bargain is violated. This rationale for holdup power explains a number ofpuzzles in
international law. In particular, it explains why international legislatures have not adopted
robust majoritarian voting and further clarifies how international institutions enforce
international aw, which citics often claim is unenforceable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The future of international lawmaking is in peril. Trade negotiations have
not concluded a major negotiating round since the creation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1994. The current round of trade negotiations, the
Doha Round, has been pronounced dead over and again.' Climate change
negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2 have failed to produce a binding agreement on
greenhouse gas emissions reductions to replace the Kyoto Protocol.3 The U.N.
Security Council has been unable to comprehensively address the humanitarian
crises in Syria. In short, the promise of robust multilateral legal governance that
the world welcomed in the early 1990s with the end of the Cold War, the
creation of the WTO,4 and the Rio Earth Summit that produced the UNFCCC
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),5 appears to have been a
mirage.
In response to multilateralism's retreat, many commentators have called for
a renewed focus on methods of international lawmaking capable of binding
reluctant states and rising powers like China and India.6 The claim is that the
world's most pressing problems cannot be solved through traditional treaty-
making, with its rules requiring states to consent to their own legal obligations.
Instead, modern international law, it is thought, requires the ability to bind
holdout states without their consent through majoritarian or super-majoritarian
decision-making.7 In short, these proposals envision international law traveling
I See, for example, Lawrence Herman & Gary C. Hufbauer, Doha is Dead, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept. 26,
2011; The Doha Round: DeadMan Talking, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 2011.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-
38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 165 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference
of the Parties, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (Dec. 10, 1997) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
4 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. IX, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
5 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S 79.
6 JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FuTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GLOBAL GOVERNMENT (2013);
Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 763 (2012); see also Geoffrey Palmer,
New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 279 (1992) (describing an
international legislature for environmental law); Laurence R. Heifer, Nonconsensual International
Lawmaking 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 71 (2008) (analyzing the rise of nonconsensual lawmaking in
international law).
7 Guzman, supra note 6, at 749 ("An excessive commitment to consent can cripple efforts to use
international law as a tool to help solve the world's largest problems"); TRACHTMAN, supra note 6,
at 253 ("There will be increased demand both for more international law and for more
international organizational capacity to provide mechanisms for legislative or decision-making
action.").
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the road taken by federal systems such as the United States and the European
Union: from contractual lawmaking-in which states are free to make
commitments to each other and free to decline commitments to which they
object-to legislative lawmaking-in which states, through international
institutions, make collective decisions about what legal obligations to undertake.
However, international egislatures-institutions that make collective decisions
about the legal obligations that a group of states may make to each other-have
already proliferated in recent decades, replacing to a large degree the contractual
model of negotiations that dominated international law in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.8 Examples of international legislatures include the
Ministerial Conference of the WTO; the Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC and the CBD, among many other environmental treaties; the
Assembly of Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;9
and of course, the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council.
This move from contract to legislation is puzzling, though. Unlike
domestic legislatures, such as the U.S. Congress, international legislatures do not
have the robust majoritarian decision-making rules that commentators have
predicted and called for.10 Instead, they preserve the basic requirement that
states consent to their own legal obligations before being bound. As a
consequence, international legislatures produce instruments that look very
similar to those produced by contractual lawmaking. We have thus seen the
spread of collective decision-making through legislative institutions without
seeing what many assumed would follow with international legislatures: the rise
of decision-making procedures that would allow holdouts to be bound without
their consent.
In this Article, I argue that the solution to this puzzle lies in understanding
that the rise of international legislatures is not driven by the desire to reduce the
role of holdouts. Rather, international legislatures exist to magnij the ability of
holdouts to stall and even paralyze international lawmaking. Further, I contend
that the increased importance of holdouts is, within limits, beneficial for
international lawmaking.
Rising interdependence among nations has increased the need for
institutional mechanisms capable of enforcing bargains among states. The need
for enforcement mechanisms is particularly important where states negotiate for
a period of time over a series of related issues. Iterative negotiations of this
8 See infra Section II.
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 12, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
10 Even where agreements do provide for majoritarian decision-making, as the WTO Agreement
does, they often express a preference, carried in practice, for decision-making by consensus. See
WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. IX.
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kind-found in negotiations over the different chapters of free trade agreements
(for example, intellectual property versus trade in goods or services versus
investment), different sources of pollution under the auspices of a framework
agreement such as the UNFCCC or the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution," and efforts to build a robust international
criminal law-are a hallmark of modern international lawmaking. In these
negotiations, states may wish to make legislative bargains in which one state
agrees to make concessions during the first round of negotiations in exchange
for concessions from other states in a later round of negotiations. States may
wish, in effect, to "trade votes" on issues just as domestic legislators do. Such
legislative bargains are, however, prone to opportunism by states. A state making
a concession in an early negotiation in expectation of receiving concessions in
later negotiations needs some guarantee that other states will honor the
agreement. Absent such a guarantee, states may be unwilling or unable to
bargain effectively across multiple negotiations.
Legislatures solve this problem by creating procedures that allow a single
state or small group of states to prevent other states from making legal
commitments to each other. Domestic legislatures achieve this task through
rules like the filibuster in the U.S. Senate 2 or the committee system, under which
a proposal favored by the majority of a house of Congress can still fail to reach
the floor for a vote. 3 In international legislatures, this holdup power is created
primarily by a procedure that requires member states to "adopt" a draft
agreement before it is opened for signature and ratification. 4 This procedure
does not exist only, or even primarily, to protect states from being bound by
legal rules to which they object. To the contrary, after adoption states generally
still have the option to avoid making legal commitments by choosing not to
ratify an agreement. Instead, adoption exists to allow states to prevent
lawmaking between other groups of states. The threat of holding out gives states
that make concessions in an early round of negotiations a stick they can use to
ensure that the outcome of later negotiations reflects the overall legislative
11 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. 10541, 1302
U.N.T.S. 217.
12 See Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXII, UNITED STATECS SENATE COMMITrEI ON RULES &
ADMINISTRATION, available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII
(describing invocation of cloture to bring filibuster to close).
13 For background on the committee system, see Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The
Insfitutional Foundaions of Commitee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 85, 85 (Mar. 1987).
14 See, for example, UNFCCC, supra note 2, arts. 15-17 (setting out procedures for the adoption of
amendments and protocols to the UNFCCC); WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. X (establishing
procedures for adopting amendments to WTO obligations).
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bargain. And by ensuring the enforceability of legislative bargains, this holdup
power ultimately facilitates international lawmaking.
This insight-that international legislatures confer holdup power on states
as a costly commitment device to make legislative bargains enforceable--casts a
new light on two important issues in international law. First, it explains why
international legislatures have emerged but have not adopted majoritarian
decision-making. Unanimous decision-making rules or supermajority voting,
coupled with the inability to remove states from legislatures, are necessary to
create the holdup power that is central to the logic of international legislatures.
Second, critics of international law have posited that it cannot affect behavior
due to weak enforcement mechanisms.'" International legislatures provide an
enforcement tool, allowing states to hold up future lawmaking to punish
breaches of not only legislative bargains, but also substantive legal commitments.
International legislatures are therefore an institutional tool that can magnify the
effect of reputational considerations in driving compliance with international
law.
This Article proceeds in four sections. Section II documents the shift in
international lawmaking from international agreements that are negotiated as
contracts to international agreements that are negotiated in legislatures. The rise
of international legislatures is critical because the ability of holdouts to use
institutional rules to stall lawmaking does not exist in contractual lawmaking, the
classic paradigm used to analyze international agreements. In contractual
lawmaking, states are free to exclude parties or issues that complicate
negotiations, shrinking the size of cooperation in an effort to reach an
agreement (although it will not be practical to do so in some circumstances).
Section III briefly reviews the literature on global government. This
literature focuses to a large degree on the role of consent in international
lawmaking. In general, proponents of more robust global government decry the
requirement that states consent before being bound by legal rules on the
grounds that the consent requirement frustrates welfare-enhancing changes in
the law. Others worry that eroding the consent requirement would delegitimize
international law or run afoul of domestic constitutional rules. By contrast I
argue that, while the consent requirement and its reform is important, the
literature's focus on consent obscures as much about global governance as it
illuminates. International legislatures exist not to eliminate the requirement that
1 See, for example, JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAl. LAW
(2005) (arguing that states comply with international law because of self-interest); John 0.
McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democray and International Human Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1739, 1769 and n. 113 (2009) ("Our view, like that of many other modern theorists, is that states
do not have a strong tendency to comply with international law for the sake of international law
compliance, or even to maintain their reputation among other nation states.").
W/inter 2014
Myer
Chicago Journal of International Law
states consent to their own obligations; they exist to allow states the opportunity
to have a say over the legal commitments other states make among themselves.
Section IV explains the rise of international legislatures and the limits on
their jurisdiction. In particular, I argue that by institutionalizing jurisdiction,
international legislatures greatly reduce the ability of states to exclude issues or
parties that threaten to derail negotiations. Legislatures are in this important way
much less flexible than contractual negotiations. This lack of flexibility is the tool
states use to credibly commit to legislative bargains.
This lack of flexibility is also at the heart of the crisis in international
lawmaking. Holdup power, in order to be beneficial, must also be limited. States
have developed a number of tools to narrow the power to paralyze legislative
negotiations. Some regimes, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and the WTO (GAT-T/WTO), provide safety valves that allow states to
narrow the scope of negotiations by negotiating with only a subset of member
states or over a subset of issues. 6 The requirement that states ratify international
legislative agreements performs a similar function. By ensuring states that they
will not be bound by rules they individually find objectionable, international
legislatures ensure that the holdup power they create will only be narrowly used
as a bargaining tactic.
The most common tactic states use to animate legislative governance,
however, is the fragmenting of jurisdiction among multiple institutions. For
example, the UNFCCC negotiates legal rules that aim to affect energy
consumption by incentivizing a shift to fuels low in greenhouse gases.' 7 At the
same time, however, energy production and consumption rules are set directly in
organizations such as the International Energy Agency (lEA)'8 and the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC). 9 Fragmenting jurisdiction
allows organizations such as the IEA and OPEC to function without the
paralysis that besets institutions like the UNFCCC. But animating governance
within these institutions through narrow jurisdiction has the effect of raising the
costs of coordinating legal rules across related institutions, such as the lEA and
the UNFCCC. Fragmentation thus animates governance within institutions
while inhibiting governance across institutions.
These limits on the holdup power, while partially effective, thus come at a
significant cost to multilateral governance-they encourage institutions with
16 See, for example, WTO Agreement, supra note 4 (discussing existence of Plurilateral Trade
Agreements which generally limit scope and number of parties).
17 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3.
18 Agreement on an International Energy Program, Nov. 18, 1974, 37 U.S.T. 1685, 276 U.N.T.S. 3
(establishing the lEA).
19 Statute of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States, Jan. 1961, 443 U.N.T.S. 247.
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narrow jurisdiction and make it difficult to coordinate legal rules across
institutions. To remedy this deficiency, Section IV proposes a new technique to
reduce the costs of legislative paralysis: the use of what I call exclusion clauses.
These clauses would permit states under a specified set of circumstances to
suspend the right of a holdout state to vote. Doing so would allow a measure
that enjoys popular support to advance, while still preserving the ability of states
to hold out in the great majority of circumstances. Allowing states to be
suspended temporarily would thus encourage legislatures with broad jurisdiction,
which would reduce coordination costs, while still preserving the key function of
legislatures: facilitating legislative bargains.
II. FROM CONTRACT TO LEGISLATION
For the last two hundred years at least, contract has supplied the primary
paradigm for thinking about international lawmaking. During that period,
treaties-legal agreements between states-have supplanted customary
international law as the primary instrument states use to regulate their activities.
Like contracts, treaties are generally viewed as consensual agreements that can
only create obligations for those that consent."a The contractual paradigm thus
involves an individualist lawmaking framework in which each state is the master
of its own commitments. In this Section, I argue that contrary to this traditional
view, since the latter half of the twentieth century and in particular the end of
the Cold War, contractual lawmaking by states has been replaced to a significant
extent by legislative lawmaking. Legislative lawmaking, as I use the term, is
characterized by a set of procedural rules governing collective decision-making
processes as to the kinds of commitments a group of states may make. This
collective decision-making process, in which the group must first approve the
obligations taken on by states individually, differentiates legislative lawmaking
from contractual lawmaking. Yet the breadth of this change and its ramifications
for how international law is made have gone unexplored, in part because the
outcome, a treaty, often looks identical regardless of the lawmaking procedure
used.
20 See, for exampe, Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Snpremag Clause and the
Judidal Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 605-06 (2008) (arguing that treaties are
"contracts between nations"); PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RuLES AND POLITICAL
POSSIBILITIES viii (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (describing treaties as "contracts among
states"); Arnold D. McNair, The Funclions and Diering Legal Character of Treaties, 11 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 100, 106 (1930) ("The legal identity of treaties and contracts is almost universally assumed by
writers upon international law.").
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A. Treaties as Contracts Between States
Treaties, the dominant instruments in modern international law,"' are often
said to be contracts between states.22 During the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, treaties were viewed as contracts between princes, binding only upon
them and not their successors.23 Later, as international law matured, the great
international legal theorist Grotius developed a general theory of the treaty as a
specialized type of contract.24 This comparison has persisted to the present day,
with treaties analyzed as contracts with respect to the bargaining issues present
in their formation, enforcement issues related to their implementation, and their
interpretation. 5 Indeed, treaty text often makes explicit reference to the
contractual paradigm, referring for example to member states as "Contracting
Parties."26
The treaty as contractual agreement has been a critical tool of international
legal order over the years and remains so today. I define "contractual
agreements" as agreements between states that are negotiated between states
outside of any overarching institutional framework. Contractual agreements
might be "contractual treaties" if they are binding agreements, or they might be
"contractual soft law" if they are nonbinding.27 As with arm's length contracting
between firms, states negotiate the terms of such agreements largely free from
the procedural rules and governing principles, not to mention the administrative
support staff that comes with institutionalized negotiations. Most importantly,
contractual agreements do not involve any collective decision as to the kind of
21 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS RELATION TO UNITED STATES LAW, Introductory Note (1987); see
also id. at 144; Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and Ameican Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
397 (1998).
22 See Vazquez, supra note 20, at 605-6; McNair, supra note 20, at 106.
23 HEDLFY BuI.l, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 29 (3d ed.
2002).
24 Id.
25 See, for example, Guzman, supra note 6, at 763 (discussing how treaties, like contracts, create
transfers among parties to ensure that cooperation is in each state's interest); Curtis J. Mahoney,
Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824,
847-51 (2006).
26 See, for example, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331(hereinafter Vienna Convention).
27 For the distinction between hard law and soft law, see, for example, Andrew T. Guzman &
Timothy Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL. ANALYSIS 171 (2010); Gregory C. Shaffer &
Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International
Governance, 94 MINN. L. REv. 706 (2010).
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commitments states may make. Any group of states can enter into a contractual
agreement defining the obligations undertaken by the members without seeking
the permission of an institution. This autonomy differs from legislative
lawmaking, in which states collectively decide what kinds of obligations the
institution's members may make under the institution's umbrella.
Perhaps the most prevalent kind of "contractual treaty" today is the
bilateral investment treaty (BIT'). These agreements are negotiated on an ad hoc
basis between states; their negotiation is not subject to rules imposed by any
international institution; and two countries entering into a BIT do not first
require the affirmative vote of a collective body such as a diplomatic conference
or Conference of the Parties to a multilateral treaty.28 The terms of BITs are
therefore determined by the outcome of a procedurally unstructured bargaining
process between states. The unstructured nature of these negotiations is
sometimes lost because of how similar BITs are to each other. But the
convergence of the substance in BITs is, perhaps counterintuitively, at least
partially a product of this lack of institutional structure. Capital-exporting states
have to date by and large been able to dictate the terms of BITs, while capital-
importing states have largely accepted the terms offered.29 This feature of BIT
negotiations can give BITs the feel of contracts of adhesion,3" but the point
remains: they are contracts negotiated without many institutional or procedural
formalities.
B. Treaties as Products of International Legislatures
Despite the importance of the contract analogy, many modern treaties are
not negotiated as contracts. Rather, treaties as different as the Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court are negotiated within institutions that
I shall call "international legislatures."'" I define an international legislature as an
28 The law of treaties does provide some basic background rules governing formation of treaties. See
generally Vienna Convention, supra note 26. The Vienna Convention, however, is more akin to the
basic rules of contract formation found in the common law. It stipulates the steps necessary to
enter into a treaty-such as evincing consent to be bound in some fashion-rather than spelling
out detailed rules on issues such as voting and agenda control that shape negotiation outcomes.
29 Jose E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U.J. INT'l. L. & Poi.. 17, 26 (2009) ("[BITs] are more like
contracts of adhesion or 'unequal treaties' since in the 'typical' instance ... these agreements are
imposed by rich capital exporters on poor states desperate for capital and insufficiently prepared
to know what they are signing.").
30 Id.
31 The terms "international legislation" and "legislative treaties" are sometimes used to refer to
international instruments that create obhgations for states that have not expressly consented. See,
for exampk, Bradley, supra note 21, at 396; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and
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institution in which legal rules are negotiated subject to a collective decision-
making process that determines the commitments states may make to each
other. This collective decision-making process is governed by a set of procedural
rules that vary in terms of their formality across institutions. Collective decision-
making is the hallmark of legislative governance. In contractual lawmaking, any
state is free to make legal commitments to any other state. Members of an
international legislature, however, may not make commitments to each other
under the institution's auspices unless the group as a whole first approves. For
example, a protocol to the UNFCCC to replace the Kyoto Protocol cannot be
ratified by states until it is first adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC.32 Also, the WTO's Ministerial Conference must adopt any changes to
any WTO agreements.33 Subjecting chemicals to the protections spelled out in
the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs Convention)
similarly requires a vote of the Conference of the Parties to that Convention. 4
International legislatures are widespread and vary considerably in the
degree to which they institutionalize lawmaking efforts. Some legislatures are ad
hoc diplomatic conferences that are convened for the purpose of negotiating a
single instrument and then are disbanded. Examples include the U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, which produced the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea,3" and the diplomatic conferences that negotiated the Vienna
Conventions on Diplomatic Relations and Consular Relations.36 Others are
standing bodies that engage in continued lawmaking over a period of years. The
U.N. Security Council and the U.N. General Assembly are perhaps the best-
known examples of standing legislatures,3" but the Conference of the Parties
(COPs) (or similar body) to treaties such as the UNFCCC,38 the WTO,3 9 the
International Law, 42 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 128 (2003); Alvarez, supra note 29, at 25
(describing as "legislative treaties" those that have effect beyond their members by virtue of the
fact that they are codifying customary international law); S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of
'Tegulatog Arbitration "-Abaclat v. Aentine Republic and the International Investment Regime, 38 J.
CORP. L. 259, 263 (2013). My focus, however, is on the procedures by which an instrument is
negotiated, rather than its effect, and so I focus on "legislatures" rather than "legislation."
32 UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 17.
33 WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. X.
34 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, art. 8, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119,
[hereinafter POPs Convention].
35 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
36 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95;
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
37 See, for example, Erik Voeten, Clashes in the Assembly, 54 INT'L ORG. 185, 185-86 (2000); Ian
Johnstone, Legislation andAdjudication in the U.N. Securio Council Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit,
102 A.J.I.L 275, 283-94 (2008).
38 UNFCCC, supra note 2.
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POPs Convention, 40 the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent
(Rotterdam Convention),4' the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species of Flaura and Fauna (CITES),42  the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,43 and the International Convention
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna,' are all standing bodies.4"
In addition to the distinction between ad hoc versus standing institutions,
international legislatures vary in the extent to which they formalize negotiations
through the use of procedural rules. Thus, while the hallmark of legislative
lawmaking is collective decision-making about the kinds of legal obligations
states may make to each other, the distinction between contractual lawmaking
and legislative lawmaking is a continuum between institutions that have highly
structured decision-making processes on the one hand, and institutions that have
informal decision-making structures on the other hand. Some legislative bodies
impose very few procedural rules. For example, the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference promulgated rules of procedure that contained only three
meaningful articles.46 Negotiation in such institutions may not differ markedly
from contractual negotiations. By contrast, other institutions impose a host of
procedures governing even minor points of parliamentary procedure. The Rules
of Procedure of the U.N. General Assembly, for example, have been described
as "the fullest and the best developed system of procedural norms of
international organizations." '47 Similarly, the Rotterdam Convention and the
POPs Convention both create detailed procedures for legislative action by the
COP.48 Such institutions come closest to domestic legislatures in modern liberal
39 WTO Agreement, supra note 4.
40 POPs Convention, supra note 34.
41 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337 [hereinafter
Rotterdam Convention].
42 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973,
27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
43 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161
U.N.T.S. 361. [hereinafter ICWj.
44 International Convention for the Conservation of Adantic Tuna, May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887,
673 U.N.T.S. 63.
45 Other examples of international institutions that can create international legislation include the
International Monetary Fund and the institutions of the European Union. See Curtis A. Bradley &
Judith G. Kelley, The Concept ofInternational Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 10 (2008).
46 ROBBIE SABEI., PROCEDURE AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES: A STUDY OF THE RULiE'S OF
PROCEDURE AT THE U.N. AND AT INTFR-GOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCES 8 (1997).
47 Id. at 5 (quoting JAN KOLASA, RULES OF PROCEDURF OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMB.LY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 111 (1967)).
48 POPs Convention, supra note 34, art. 8; Rotterdam Convention, supra note 41, art. 18.
Winter 2014
Myer
Chicago Journal of International Law
constitution systems. The effect of this variation in legislatures is to create a
continuum between purely contractual negotiations completely undisciplined by
procedures and rigorously legislative ones, encumbered by detailed procedures
across a range of issues.
Critically, international legislation, the instruments produced by
international legislatures, can look identical to contractual agreements when
completed. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, is international legislation. It was
negotiated and adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, an
international legislature.49 Just like a contractual agreement such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), ° the Kyoto Protocol had to be
signed and ratified by countries before it came into force. Moreover,
international legislative treaties and contractual treaties are equally subject to the
law of treaties. This view that treaties are identical no matter how produced is
reflected throughout commentary on international law. To give but one
illustrative critique, Lord McNair writes:
If international society wishes to enact a fundamental, organic constitutional
law.., it employs the treaty. If two states wish to put on record their
adherence to the principle of the three mile limit of territorial waters ...
they use a treaty .... And if it is desired to create an international
organization such as the International Union for the Protection of Works of
Art and Literature, which resembles the corporation of private law, it is
done by treaty.5'
The resemblance between international legislation and contractual agreements in
their final form obscures the fundamental shift that has occurred in international
lawmaking. In part, this is because the collective decision that an international
legislature makes rarely gives rise to binding obligations absent some further
action by states.52 Instead, the collective decision-making process is most often
employed in voting on proposed texts.53 The most important such vote is on the
"adoption" of the final text that is opened for signature and ratification. 4
Adoption is the process used by international legislatures to indicate that they
are done negotiating and the draft treaty may now be approved by states.
49 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3.
5o North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 IL.M. 289, 605 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
51 See McNair, supra note 20, at 101.
52 See Heifer, supra note 6, at 85 (noting that "deviations from the consent principle ... are often
linked in ways that preserve a modicum of state sovereignty").
53 See SABE I., supra note 46, at 258-301 (discussing voting procedures at international conferences).
54 See, for example, UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 17 (stating that the UNFCCC's COP may "adopt
protocols to the Convention" but that the entry into force provisions shall be contained in the
protocol itself); Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, art. 8, Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 (1987) (same).
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Adoption is a step that occurs prior to-and is separate from-consenting to be
bound by a treaty.55
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention)
provides default rules for adoption. Specifically, the Vienna Convention
provides that a treaty negotiated in an "international conference" shall be
adopted by a two-thirds vote of those states present and voting, unless states
adopt some other rule by the same two-thirds vote. 6 If a draft treaty is not
adopted by the international legislature that negotiated it, the treaty is unlikely to
ever be enacted into law.57 It is the procedure of adoption of a draft agreement
more than anything else that distinguishes legislative negotiations from
contractual negotiations. A negative vote on adoption allows states that have no
intention of ratifying a set of obligations to prevent other states from doing so as
well-an intermediate step in lawmaking that does not meaningfully exist in
contractual negotiations."8 As we shall see, the inclusion of this collective
decision-making procedure has major ramifications for the design of
international legislatures.5 9
Adopting draft texts is not the only form of decision that international
legislatures make. International legislatures can also produce soft law
instruments: instruments that are nonbinding but have legal consequences
through their interpretation or exposition of what binding legal obligations mean
or how they will be interpreted and implemented.6" The U.N. General Assembly
is perhaps the most prolific legislative institution producing international soft
law obligations. Lacking the power to directly pass binding resolutions, the
General Assembly passes nonbinding resolutions that purport to interpret
binding international legal commitments.6" Many COPs also pass copious
5 Compare Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 9 (discussing the rules for adopting a draft text)
with Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 11 (discussing means of expressing consent to be
bound by a treaty).
56 Vienna Convention, sesora note 26, art. 9.2. Art. 9.1 provides that adoption of draft texts
negotiated outside of conferences shall be by the consent of all states participating in its
negotiation. This unanimity requirement for adoption outside of diplomatic conferences is not a
meaningful one because outside of institutionalized negotiations states can more easily be
removed from negotiations, and therefore their ability to block the adoption of a text can be
eliminated.
57 For an explanation as to why this is so, see infra Section IV.
58 Bat see supra note 56.
51 See infra Section IV.
60 See generaly, Guzman & Meyer, spra note 27; Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegalion, 32 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 888 (2009).
61 See Guzman & Meyer, supra note 27, at 216-17 (describing the General Assembly's passage of
resolutions interpreting the Refugee Convention's obligations regarding nonrefoulement);
Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularioy of Bilateral
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amounts of soft law. These soft law obligations are usually framed as Decisions
of the Parties, or some similar kind of instrument, and often purport to interpret
or implement the legal obligations contained in related treaty instruments. For
example, a mere decision of the parties created the Kyoto Protocol's compliance
mechanism, which establishes an oversight mechanism and provides for
sanctions in the event of noncompliance.62 Similarly, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) has developed a set of rules
governing the trade in different kinds of species through a series of decisions of
the parties that goes well beyond what is contemplated by the text of CITES
itself.63
To the extent that scholarship has differentiated among treaties, it has
tended to do so on the basis of what treaties do, rather than the procedures
through which they are negotiated. 4 Professor Bodansky, for example, has
described the difference between constitutive treaties and regulatory treaties.6"
Constitutive treaties are those that create institutions to engage in negotiations,
while regulatory treaties are those that create substantive rules of conduct.66
Thus, the U.N. Charter is primarily a constitutive treaty because it establishes
institutions such as the General Assembly and the Security Council, 7 while the
Geneva Conventions are regulatory treaties because they create rules of conduct
for states. Professor Trachtman has made a similar distinction between
"international constitutional law" and "ordinary international law."68 Similarly,
scholars have noted the move to iterative negotiations in international
lawmaking. For example, Professor Setear (among others) has written about the
so-called "convention-protocol" approach, in which parties negotiate a
framework agreement that elaborates basic principles and contemplates future
subsidiary agreements that create rules of conduct.6 9
Investment Treaties, 38 VA.J. INT'L L. 639, 648-51, 684-87 (1998) (discussing the General Assembly
Resolutions linked to the New International Economic Order that purported to reinterpret
customary investment law).
62 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3.
63 See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 158-59
(2010).
64 For a comprehensive discussion of how international institutions can make law, see JOSE E.
ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (2005).
65 See BODANSKY, supra note 63, at 158-59, 176.
66 Id. at 158.
67 The U.N. Charter contains rules of conduct as well, such as the rules on the use of force and self-
defense contained in arts. 2 and 51. See U.N. Charter, arts. 2, 51.
68 See TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at 255.
69 John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theog and
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 217-23 (1996) [hereinafter Iterative Perspective]. See also
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These lines of thought clearly implicate international legislatures.
International legislatures are, most obviously, created by treaties that might be
termed constitutive treaties. And although not usually conceived of in this way,
the convention-protocol approach to treaty-making is a form of legislative
lawmaking. The framework convention is the constitutive treaty that establishes
an international legislature-usually a COP-that negotiates the subsequent
protocols. Neither of these schools of thought, however, has paid attention to
how legislatures' use of collective decision-making has changed international
lawmaking. Instead, framework agreements and constitutive treaties are often
treated like memoranda of understanding in business deals; they elaborate basic
principles and terms agreed to and set the stage for future negotiations, but the
important lawmaking work is left almost entirely for subsequent substantive
agreements.7 °
Nevertheless, contractual negotiations are dramatically different from
legislative negotiations in a variety of respects. These differences have significant
impacts on the outcome of negotiations, on the shape that substantive
obligations take. International lawyers and scholars would thus be well-advised
to pay greater attention to how institutions structure bargaining, and specifically
how they decide between contractual negotiations and legislative negotiations of
different scopes. As I explain below, contrary to the conventional wisdom,
contractual negotiations offer states much greater flexibility in terms of the
managing the scope of their negotiations. This flexibility, as it turns out, is both
virtue and vice.
III. THE DEBATE ABOUT CONSENT
Despite the rise of international legislatures over the twentieth century, a
number of scholars have continued to call for the expansion of collective
decision-making in international law." These scholars have tended to minimize
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDIER CHAYES, THE NEw SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAl. REGULATORY AGRIEMENTS (1995); John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and
International Law, 40 VA.J. INT'l L. 193 (1999); George W. Downs, Kyle W. Danish & Peter N.
Barsoom, The Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 30
COI.UM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465 (2000).
70 Scholars have also noted that constitutve treaties and framework conventions can spread the
administrative costs of negotiation across multiple instruments. See Andrew T. Guzman, Doctor
Frankenstein's International OrganiZations, EUR. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013) available at
http://works.bepress.com/andrewguzman/58; Iterative Perpective, supra note 69; Jose E. Alvarez,
Governing the World: International OrganiZations as Lawmakers, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'E L. REV. 591
(2008).
71 See, for example, Palmer, sepra note 6, at 279 ("The missing link.., is the equivalent of a
legislature .... We would envisage the new Environmental Protection Council ... [as] empowered
to take binding decisions.'".
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the impact of international legislatures because, as discussed in Section II, by and
large the collective decision-making procedures employed by international
legislatures do not directly lead to binding legal obligations. For the most part,
states remain free today to accept or reject international treaties, whether they
are negotiated contractually or in legislatures. 2 The introduction of collective
decision-making through international legislatures has not, as it turns out, been
strongly associated with a move away from the requirement that states consent
to any binding legal commitments they make. For these commentators, a
broader move towards nonconsensual lawmaking is necessary if states are to
confront the most pressing problems of the day. On another view, however,
nonconsensual lawmaking is illegitimate because it disrespects certain core rule-
of-law values, such as democratic accountability and domestic constitutional
norms such as the separation of powers.
In this Section, I explain the arguments for and against nonconsensual
lawmaking. I then argue that this debate over consent has overlooked the key
change in international lawmaking brought about by international legislatures:
collective decision-making in international legislatures has dramatically expanded
the requirement that states consent to each other's legal obligations, and not merely
their own. Moreover, as I discuss in greater detail in Section IV, the benefits of
collective decision-making that explain the rise of international legislatures are
exactly the opposite of the alleged benefits of nonconsensual lawmaking.
A. Nonconsensual Lawmaking and Global Government
There are perhaps few issues in international lawmaking that touch a
stronger nerve than nonconsensual lawmaking. While the requirement that states
consent to their legal obligations is a "fundamental principle of international
agreements," 3 officials such as former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey
Palmer and scholars such as Andrew Guzman, Laurence Helfer, and Joel
Trachtman have argued that modern international lawmaking should, in at least
some circumstances, include the ability to bind states against their will. 4 Absent
such ability, international law cannot tackle truly global problems such as climate
change.
72 To be clear about terminology, many scholars use the term "legislature" to refer to institutions
that make laws through majority voting.
73 Heifer, supra note 6, at 72.
74 See Palmer, supra note 6, at 273-78; Heifer, spra note 6, at 79-89, 96-123; Guzman, Against
Consent, supra note 6, at 788 (calling for reforms to international lawmaking that could include
"voting by states (as is done in many lOs) or by individuals to elect some form of international
legislative body (as is done in the E.U.)"); TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at 279 ("I have suggested
that there may be a kind of dynamic imbalance, or cascade, leading from strong dispute settlement
to greater capacity for legislation: from one type of enabling constitutionalization to another.").
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To briefly unpack this logic, consider the basic problem presented by a
lawmaking paradigm in which each subject has to individually consent to its
obligations. In such a world, no state will consent to a legal obligation that
makes it worse off than it would be under the status quo. Therefore, only
Pareto-improving changes in the law will be made-changes in which no state is
made worse off and at least one state is made better off."5
Procedural rules that require that all changes in the law be Pareto-
improving-that is, that no state be made worse off and at least one state be
made better off-impose a demanding criterion indeed. 6 Domestic lawmaking
virtually never imposes such a constraint. Instead, domestic lawmakers like
Congress or administrative agencies are free to impose losses on some groups in
order to pass legislation benefitting other groups. Entitlement programs may
take tax revenue from wealthy states and send it to poor states; health care
legislation may reduce the profits of insurance companies in order to increase
the welfare of patients; reductions in tariffs may cause workers in
noncompetitive industries to lose their jobs while overall putting more money in
the pockets of American consumers. Unlike domestic lawmaking, almost all
international lawmaking, whether contractual or legislative, occurs pursuant to
procedural rules that require states to consent to their own obligations. The
Vienna Convention-the overarching source of rules on treaty formation-
makes consent the centerpiece of its treaty formation doctrine. It defines a party,
a state bound by a treaty, as one "that has consented to be bound by the treaty,"
and it devotes seven articles to describing how that consent can be manifested.7
This consent requirement ensures that no state will agree to changes in the law
that make it worse off than it otherwise would be.
8
Pareto-improving changes in the law can be contrasted with changes in the
law that increase overall welfare but create losses for some subjects of the law,
so-called Kaldor-Hicks improvements in the law. 9 Put differently, many changes
in the law create winners whose gains exceed the losses from the losers.
75 See ROBERT COOT1, R &THOMAS UI.EN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 42 (6th ed. 2012).
76 Id.
77 Vienna Convention, supra note 26, arts. 2, 11-17. Exceptions to the rule that states must consent
to legal obligations in order to be bound include the U.N. Security Council when acting pursuant
to Chapter VII; certain technical changes to some agreements, such as the Montreal Protocol; and
customary international law, to which states can be bound without any affirmative indication of
assent. See Guzman, Against Consent, supra note 67, at 775-84 (discussing the exceptions to the
norm of consensual lawmaking).
78 Vee Guzman, Against Consent, npra note 6, at 752-55 (noting consent ensures states prefer the new
agreement, ensures legitimacy, and protects states and the international system from decreases in
joint welfare of states).
79 See COOTER & Ui.EN, supra note 75, at 42.
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Proponents of nonconsensual lawmaking essentially argue that Kaldor-Hicks
improving changes in the law-and therefore nonconsensual lawmaking
procedures that facilitate such changes-should be or will be embraced as a way
to break the deadlocks in international bargaining."0 For example, the world's
largest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States, arguably stand
to lose from the immediate imposition of drastic climate change mitigation
measures. 1 Such measures would likely curb their economic growth at a cost
that might arguably exceed the present value of their individual benefits from
mitigating climate change. China and the United States will therefore use
international law's consent requirement to avoid immediately effective legal
obligations to mitigate climate change. They will do so even though the gains to
the rest of the world from their climate change mitigation efforts-gains that
China and United States do not themselves capture-might well exceed the
losses those countries would suffer in terms of economic development.82
Nonconsensual lawmaking would solve this problem, permitting countries to
impose a loss on China and the United States in order to obtain the welfare
gains the rest of the world would enjoy from emissions reductions in those two
countries.
This literature on consent thus predicts as a descriptive matter, and calls
for as a normative matter, a greater move away from the rule that a state cannot
be bound without its consent. There are a number of different reforms that can
accomplish this task. For example, an increase in the number of international
tribunals charged with interpreting international law creates a system whereby
the law can be developed without states explicitly consenting to changes.8 3 Soft
law agreements, exit clauses, and sunset provisions can be used as a way to
weaken the status quo bias created by the consent requirement.8 4 And, of course,
international institutions could be empowered to make decisions through non-
80 In theory, if transaction costs are low enough, any Kaldor-Hicks improving change in the law can
be converted into a Pareto-improving change in the law through transfers to states that otherwise
stand to lose. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). In practice,
however, a variety of familiar bargaining problems-such as transaction costs, holdouts, and free-
riding-can prevent this result.
81 See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of
the World's Largest Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1675, 1688-89 (2008) (arguing that
the United States and China do not stand to lose from climate change but would absorb the costs
of a climate change agreement).
82 Id.
83 Guzman & Meyer, supra note 27, at 178; TRACHTMAN, sipra note 6, at 275-81.
84 See Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 379,
388 (2010) [hereinafter Exit Costs].
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unanimous voting rules.85 As Professor Trachtman recognizes, however, these
moves towards nonconsensual lawmaking are not likely to go unchallenged. As
he puts it, "a move toward enabling international constitutionalization in the
form of enhanced legislative capacity [by which he means non-unanimous
decision-making] would demand a move toward constraining international
constitutionalization."86 As we shall see, although often overlooked, legislative
governance comes with, and indeed is introduced precisely to create, these
constraints.
B. Legitimacy and Sovereignty
A second strain of commentary is fundamentally skeptical of the idea of
nonconsensual lawmaking. On this view, nonconsensual lawmaking undermines
two important features of international law. First, it can reduce the legitimacy of
international lawmaking by removing procedural protections for weak states.
Second, nonconsensual lawmaking is viewed as a challenge to state sovereignty
and, within the United States, to democratic and constitutional norms. I discuss
each critique in turn.
A number of prominent scholars, such as Thomas Franck and Daniel
Bodansky, have advocated legitimacy as a major criterion in promoting the
efficacy of international law." On this view, states are most likely to comply with
international law-and therefore international law is most likely to be successful
in solving global problems-when states perceive international law as
legitimate.88 Legitimacy is a famously squishy concept, often in the eye of the
beholder, and so in an effort to be precise these scholars have elaborated on
what constitutes "legitimate" international law. One of the most famous
expositions of legitimacy in international law defines the term as "the belief that
the law was made and is applied in accordance with right process." 89
Inclusiveness-the right to participate in lawmaking-is almost universally
85 See TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at 279; Guzman, Against Consent, supra note 6, at 788; Bradley &
Kelley, supra note 45, at 10.
86 TRACHTMAN, supra note 6, at 281.
87 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7-8, 25-46 (1995)
[hereinafter FRANCK, FAIRNILSS]; Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimay of International Governance: A
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596 (1999). See also Joost
Pauwelyn, Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research Questions, in INFORMAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 23 (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., 2012)
(discussing notions of accountability and "input" and "output" legitimacy).
88 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 25 (1990).
89 See FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 87, at 26.
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identified as a critical component of legitimate process.9" Procedural norms such
as transparency and public access to information also play a role.9"
One can easily see how nonconsensual lawmaking undermines these views
of legitimacy. Nonconsensual lawmaking has, in some of its forms, the
possibility of altogether eliminating participation by certain states. Indeed, the
U.N. Security Council, perhaps the chief example of an international institution
with nonconsensual lawmaking powers, includes only fifteen states. More
generally, however, nonconsensual lawmaking might undermine legitimacy by
encouraging a majority of states to impose their will on a minority. In
international law, notions of legitimacy are tied to notions of consent,92 and so
majoritarian decision-making sometimes faces a per se challenge that it is
illegitimate. The history of imperialism and concerns that the international legal
order reflects a fundamentally European and Anglo-American set of principles
further underscore the importance of the voice that comes with the consent
requirement.
What I will call the "non-delegation" view objects to nonconsensual
lawmaking (and sometimes to international lawmaking even when it is
consensual) on the grounds that it improperly delegates to international
organizations (and by extension, foreign governments that have influence over
these international organizations) control over legal rules then implemented
domestically. Scholars have argued both that such delegation is constitutionally
impermissible and functionally undesirable because it transfers lawmaking
90 See Bodansky, supra note 87, at 599 (noting the importance of democracy and participation to a
rule's legitimacy); FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 87, at 28 (arguing that international law's power
and reach extends to those who have consented to participate in the international community);
Rolf H. Weber, The Legitimag of the G20 as a GlobalFinancial Regulator, 28 B.F.L.R. 389, 401 (2013)
("[MInclusiveness is a basic source of legitimacy.").
91 Bodansky, supra note 87, at 600.
92 Id. at 609-10 (noting that even general consent to an institution's rulemaking procedures may not
legitimate subsequent nonconsensual lawmaking by the institution). Other notions of legitimacy
do not necessarily rule out the possibility of nonconsensual lawmaking, but they often strain to
justify that lawmaking on the grounds of consent. For example, Franck argues that, having
consented to join the international community, states thereby have consented to subsequent rules
made pursuant to those communities' norms. See FRANCK, FAIRNESS, supra note 87, at 28-29. The
rules and processes that generate norms and legal rules-the secondary rules of lawmaking-
change over time, however. See Pauwelyn, supra note 87 (studying the rise of informal lawmaking
as a complement and replacement for formal and traditional means of international lawmaking).
Indeed, these changes can even happen within institutions, such as when a Conference of the
Parties begin to act through non-binding decisions, instead of amendments to its governing treaty.
These changes are rarely accompanied by any formal consent process, and so the notion that
nonconsensual lawmaking in the abstract can always be justified by some notion of consent is a
strained notion of consent indeed.
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authority to unaccountable institutions. For example, Curtis Bradley has worried
that:
By transferring legal authority from U.S. actors to international actors-
actors that are physically and culturally more distant from, and not directly
responsible to, the U.S. electorate-[delegations of authority to international
organizations] may entail a dilution of domestic political accountability. This
accountability concern may be heightened by the lack of transparency
associated with some international decisionmaking. 93
Similarly, Jed Rubenfeld has noted that:
The antidemocratic qualities of the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international governance organizations-
their centralization, their opacity, their remoteness from popular or
representative politics, their elitism, their unaccountability-are well
known.94
The legitimacy and non-delegation schools of thought both find nonconsensual
lawmaking undesirable in most instances. The critique of nonconsensual
lawmaking does not, however, reject the basic premise of the advocates of
nonconsensual lawmaking-that nonconsensual lawmaking might allow some
welfare-enhancing changes in the law that are blocked by the consent
requirement. Rather, the critique of nonconsensual lawmaking rests on grounds
other than welfare: values such as fidelity to constitutional norms, the direct
accountability of lawmakers, and basic notions of due process and participation
that some fear may be lost in a nonconsensual environment. In other words,
scholars defend the consent requirement largely on non-welfarist grounds.
93 Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self Execution, 55 STAN.
L. Riv. 1557, 1558 (2003); see also John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part
of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1193-94 (2007) (arguing that international law involves a
"democracy deficit"); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International OrganiZations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 77-78 (2000) (advocating resuscitation of
nondelegation doctrine for foreign affairs); but see Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionaliy of
International Delegations, 104 CoIur1. L. Ri.v. 1492, 1586-1603 (2004) (arguing that international
delegations can advance the policy objectives underlying federalism, including most notably the
diffusion of power); David Golove, The New Confederalsm: Treay Delegations of Legislative, Execuve,
andJudidalAuthorio, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (2003) (expressing skepticism that "there are
any persuasive normative grounds" for a principle prohibiting delegations of authority to
international organizations); Loni Fisler Damrosch, "'Sovereign " and International Organizations, 3
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'i L. & POL'Y 159, 159-61, 165-66 (1997) (describing tensions between
delegations to international organizations and the nondelegation doctrine).
94 Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, 27 WILSON Q. 22, 34 (2003). Rubenfeld goes on to suggest
that "world democracy" might be an acceptable solution to this suggestion. Id. at 35. By world
democracy, however, he appears to mean a democracy modeled on domestic legal institutions,
subject to elections, rather than international institutions that operate with governments choosing
representatives who then vote on international legal measures.
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C. Consenting to the Obligations of Others
Commentary on international lawmaking is thus stuck on consent. On the
one hand, the literature on nonconsensual lawmaking and global government
sees international lawmaking as paralyzed by the consent requirement.
Commentators have argued for relaxing the consent requirement by moving
towards international lawmaking processes that resemble domestic lawmaking
procedures. On the other hand, nonconsensual international lawmaking is often
perceived as antithetical to democratic and constitutional values.
While consent undoubtedly is a critical issue in international lawmaking,
this focus on consent alone obscures as much as it clarifies. The confusion about
consent arises because both those for and against nonconsensual lawmaking
emphasize the role of consent on a state's own legal obligations. Yet this literature
does not explain the central puzzle of perhaps the most common form of
nonconsensual international lawmaking, legislative governance: in the decades
since the Second World War international legislatures have proliferated, but they
have failed to adopt on a large scale voting rules that would allow majorities to
bind dissenting minorities. We have thus gotten legislatures without getting rid
of the consent requirement. We have a form of governance thought to empower
majorities without having the specific rules necessary to accomplish that feat.
As I explain in Section IV, the rise of international legislatures has little to
do with eliminating the consent requirement in international law. Instead, the
introduction of legislative governance to international law is about expanding the
power of minorities to block majoritarian rulemaking. International legislatures,
in other words, create a requirement that states consent to each other's legal
obligations. International institutions' relatively stable membership and their
voting rules mean that minorities can block majorities from adopting rules that,
in the absence of the institution or the minorities' presence in it, they might
otherwise be able to enact.95 Moreover, as I explain below, this holdup power
created by legislatures is a good thing because it actually facilitates bargaining
among states.
Before turning to that analysis, however, it is useful to contextualize the
role of international legislatures in a broader discussion of legislatures. Domestic
9 Of course, in theory states can always step outside an international organization in order to make
a contractual treaty with a subset of an institution's membership if efforts at a legislative treaty are
defeated. As discussed in Section IV, this kind of forum shopping is costly for a number of
reasons. These costs and the limits they put on forum shopping give leverage to minorities within
legislatures because they make legislatures a more important vehicle for lawmaking. In situations
in which forum shopping costs are low, the leverage of minorities is reduced due to states being
able to exit more freely. See Meyer, Exit Costs, stpra note 84 (arguing that states may deliberately
reduce the exit costs associated with an international agreement in order to facilitate
renegotiation).
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legislatures, such as the U.S. Congress, are often thought to exist to implement
majority rule.96 After all, formally ordinary legislation can be passed by a simple
majority vote of both houses. This feature allows dissenters to be overridden
and allows the passage of Kaldor-Hicks improving legislation, as discussed
above.
As is well-known, however, the U.S. Congress (to take an example of a
domestic legislature) has many procedural rules that are counter-majoritarian.
Perhaps the most obvious is the filibuster in the Senate, whereby a minority of
senators can block a majority from acting.9" In fact, the internal organization of
Congress is designed to create veto points that undermine the majoritarian
structure of Congress's basic voting rules. The committee system used in both
houses of Congress famously allows very powerful committee chairs and
committee members to prevent legislation from reaching the floor, even when
the measure would pass if it could get out of committee.98 Weingast and
Marshall famously argued that the committee system is established in this way in
order to enforce legislative bargains. 99 Agreements to trade support on one
legislative matter for support on another are not enforceable before any court.
The possibility therefore exists that legislators will refuse to honor agreements to
swap votes. The committee system deters this form of opportunism, and thus
facilitates legislative bargains, by creating property rights in committee
assignments. Committee members can use their privileged position on a
committee to interfere with their colleagues' agendas. This possibility provides
an incentive for legislators to honor their agreements. Renege on a deal to trade
votes with a colleague and you may find your future priorities buried in that
colleague's committee, no matter how popular they may be in the house as a
whole. 100
The rise of international legislatures, and the use of collective decision-
making that facilitates rather than mitigates the power of minorities, is consistent
with this account of how domestic legislatures work. Legislatures may allow for
majoritarian decision-making, but they do so within a more complicated
96 See David Schleicher, Cit, Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1700-1 (2013) (discussing political
science literature on how legislatures prevent the cycling that results from majority rule).
97 See, for example, Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajori~y Voting Rules,
106 Nw. U. L. RE V. 1091, 1096 (2012) (describing the filibuster procedures). Other examples
would include the use of holds by individual senators to prevent certain pieces of business, such
as nominations, from proceeding to a floor vote.
98 Seefor example, Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 13 (cataloguing the literature on, and analyzing the
role of, congressional committees).
99 Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial OtganiZation of Congress: Or, Why Legislatures,
like Firms, Are Not OrganieZed as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988).
100 Id. at 144.
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framework. That framework is designed not simply to provide for untrammeled
rule by the majority. Rather, it exists to support the enforceability of bargains
that cannot be enforced by courts. Bargains among states acting as international
lawmakers are not dramatically different from bargains among domestic
legislators. The argument about the organization and purpose of international
legislatures, to which I now turn, thus treats international lawmaking-not as a
sui generis form of law-but as a species of lawmaking with much in common,
and much to learn from, its domestic analog.
IV. A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATURES
In this Section, I propose a theory explaining the rise of international
legislatures and the limits on their jurisdiction. I begin by contrasting contractual
lawmaking and legislative lawmaking. The key insight is that contractual
lawmaking is more flexible than legislative lawmaking in at least one key respect:
in contractual lawmaking reluctant parties or thorny issues are more easily
excluded. Legislatures rarely permit negotiations to be "scaled down" through
exclusion as can be done in contractual negotiations. This observation runs
counter to the conventional wisdom, which views legislative governance linked
to majoritarian decision-making as more flexible than contractual negotiations
weighed down by the consent requirement.
International legislatures, I argue, exist precisely to create this kind of
inflexibility. Moving bargaining into a legislative institution creates a collective
decision-making process in which holdout states can prevent cooperation-
minded states from making commitments to each other, a possibility that does
not exist in contractual bargaining. I explain how these costs are in fact valuable
to states. Granting states holdup power through legislative bargaining allows
states to use the threat of holding out in future lawmaking efforts to enforce
legislative bargains. The inflexibility of international legislatures is thus a
commitment device that ultimately lubricates international lawmaking. On the
other hand, holdouts are costly to present bargaining efforts, and so states will
seek to place some limits the use of holdouts through a variety of legislative
techniques. I conclude this Section by analyzing several such techniques, most
notably fragmenting jurisdiction over related issues among multiple institutions.
A. Contractual Versus Legislative Negotiations
1. Contractual negotiations.
When states sit down to negotiate contractual agreements, they control
both the number of issues in the negotiation and the states that will ultimately be
bound by the resulting agreement. I refer to the membership of a negotiating
body and the issues under negotiation as the jurisdiction of the negotiating body.
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Where legislatures are concerned, this jurisdiction is formal. Legislatures can
only permissibly make rules for states and on issues within their jurisdiction. For
contractual negotiations, no such formal jurisdiction exists. Because contractual
negotiations lack formal jurisdiction, states can both expand or reduce the issues on
the table and the number or identity of the members in order to reach an
agreement that states are both willing to participate in and likely to comply
with.101 Contractual negotiations are thus more flexible than institutionalized
negotiations in which modifying the jurisdiction of the institution requires the
consent of the institution's members, some of whom may be opposed.
Traditionally, commentators and policymakers have focused on how states
negotiate agreements by expanding the issues and parties at the table."0 2 Adding
issues and parties creates more possible bargains because it expands the number
of issues across which trades can be made. States can then yield on points that
are of little interest to them, but of much interest to other parties, in exchange
for concessions that are of greater value. This ability to make issue linkages is
valuable because it can respond to threats by holdout states (states that refuse to
join the agreement unless they are offered better terms) to exit the negotiations.
Contractual negotiations, however, have the crucial feature that, precisely
because they lack institutionalized jurisdiction, they can discard issue linkages
that are not valuable to them. States can thus shrink the scope of contractual
negotiations to a single very narrow issue, such as inspection procedures at
international ports. 3 Perhaps one of the most well-known issue linkages to be
thrown out is the linkage between forest preservation and climate change at the
1992 Rio Earth Summit. There, developing states opposed linking forest
preservation to climate change on the grounds that they stood to lose the
potential for economic development in a forestry convention without receiving
sufficient offsetting benefits. °4
101 International agreements generally have to satisfy both a participation constraint (states must be
willing to sign up to the legal rules being negotiated) and a compliance constraint (states must be
willing to abide by the rules). See SCOTT BARRETFr, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE
STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING (2003). Controlling the number and identity of
negotiating parties and issues on the table allows states to try to create agreements that satisfy
both of these constraints.
102 See Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT'L ORG. 761, 787 (2001); Paul Poast, Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from
European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945, 66 INT'L ORG. 277, 282-83 (2012); TRACHTMAN, supra
note 6.
103 Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, 36th Amendment (adopted May 23,
2013), (effective date August 20, 2013), available at https://www.parismou.org/system/files/
Paris%20MoU%2C%20incl% 2036th%20amendment%20%28final%29.pdf.
104 See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAEI.KE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 154-57 (4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter HUNTER ET AL.].
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The fact that issue linkages can be discarded in ad hoc bargaining when
they are not value-creating probably accounts for many commentators' intuition
that issue linkages are generally used to facilitate welfare-increasing trades among
states.10 5 In contractual negotiations resulting in agreements, we would only
expect to observe issue linkages when they improve welfare.0 6 Where
membership is concerned, states likewise can be allowed to go their own way
when their participation is not necessary, or they can have their demands
accommodated when their participation is meaningful and the threat of exit is
credible. Thus, American and E.U. participation on free trade is very meaningful,
and so developing states followed the Americans and the Europeans from the
GATT to the WTO. 107 American membership in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court is not worth the concessions it would require, and
so other states preferred to proceed without the United States. 8
Contractual bargaining thus allows for the possibility of excluding holdout
states rather than making issue linkages necessary to satisfy the holdouts. Put
differently, contractual bargaining allows states to shrink the scale of
cooperation when doing so improves the value of the agreement to its potential
members. Of course, the structure of a problem may make it so that exclusion is
not feasible and issue linkages are necessary to create side payments. For
example, cooperation on international watercourses generally requires the
participation of the upstream state. 09 And cooperation on certain issues will
require some minimum level of participation in order for it to be worthwhile for
participating states."0 Treaties like the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (the "MARPOL Convention") frequently
105 See, for example, Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatoy Jurisdiction and the WI1O, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 631,
632-33 (2007).
106 This is not to say, of course, that all issue linkages are welfare-enhancing. The most notable
example of an issue linkage that is thought not to be welfare enhancing is the inclusion of TRIPs
under the auspices of the WTO. Commentators have worried that the intellectual property rules
enshrined in the TRIPs Agreement actually make developing states worse off than they were
under the pre-TRIPs GAIT regime because developing states now must pay considerably more
for, perhaps most importantly, patented medicines. The logic of issue linkages that do not
improve the position of all states relative to the status quo is that some powerful state is able to
remove the status quo as an available option. Thus, the U.S. and the E.U. withdrew from the
GATT] 1947 and acceded to the WTO, forcing states that wished to maintain favorable market
access to follow suit.
107 See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bagaining and Outcomes in the
GA IT! FO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002).
108 Ruth Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 194 (2001).
109 Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado
River as the International Boundary, Nov. 23, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 7313.
110 BARRETT, supra note 101.
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require ratification by states that account for a certain amount of economic
activity."' The MARPOL Convention, for example, requires ratification by at
least fifteen states accounting for fifty percent of the world's shipping tonnage.' 2
These provisions ensure that the treaty does not enter into force unless there is a
critical mass of states justifying the costs of cooperation." 3 But in general,
contractual bargaining allows states greater flexibility in adjusting the number of
parties and issues under negotiation, either in the interests of expanding
cooperation or narrowing it. The importance of this point cannot be overstated.
As governance of major international issues such as climate change and trade
has moved from contractual bargaining to institutional bargaining, states'
discretion to shrink the scope of cooperation has been greatly reduced.
2. Institutional bargaining.
Bargaining over the creation of legal rules within legislatures changes this
dynamic entirely. Excluding, and to a lesser extent adding, both new members
and new issues is much more difficult when jurisdiction has been
institutionalized. Therefore, perhaps counterintuitively, legislative governance is
less flexible than contractual negotiations.
First, bargaining within institutions fixes the identities of the members
because international legislative institutions do not usually have mechanisms to
remove states that obstruct bargaining. While states often have the right to
voluntarily exit,14 a majority has no means to adjust downward the parties
whose consent is necessary. The result is that holdout states have the ability to
paralyze institutional negotiations in a way that they could not paralyze
contractual negotiations. By contrast, holding out in contractual negotiations is a
risky proposition because if your participation becomes more trouble than it is
worth, the remaining states can move forward without you.
Moreover, voting rules in international legislatures create a high bar for
action. Many institutions require consensus and those that do not still usually
require supermajorities." 5 The combination of these two features means that, in
most international legislatures, a single state or a small group of states can veto
actions favored by a majority of cooperation-minded states. Put differently,
111 International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships art. 15.1, Nov. 2,
1973,12 I.L.M. 1319, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.
112 Id.
113 See also Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 16.1, Sept. 16, 1987,
1522 26 I.L.M. 1550, U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
114 Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. RV. 1579, 1589 (2005).
115 See Heifer, supra note 6.
Winter 2014
Myer
Chicago Journal of International Law
international legislatures create institutionally-specific bargaining power that
does not exist in contractual negotiations.
The U.N. Security Council is the most obvious example of an institution
whose rules give states considerably more bargaining power within the
institution than they have outside of it. France, the U.K., and Russia all wield
vetoes on the Security Council that make their assent necessary for collective
action under the Security Council's auspices, even though in the absence of the
Security Council many security problems could quite easily be addressed without
those three nations' participation, and even over their objections. An even more
technical example is the negotiation of the crime of aggression in the
Conference of the Parties to the Rome Statute. Although the voting rules of the
COP required only a two-thirds vote of the Statute's membership to adopt the
proposed aggression amendments, a number of delegations failed to present
credentials entitling them to vote."6 Thus, while in principle the COP's decision
rule would have allowed states to adopt a robust definition of the crime of
aggression over the objection of the U.S. and its allies, in practice the decision
rule as applied required consensus."' As a result, states such as the U.S. that
have little intention of ever ratifying the Aggression Amendments were able to
use the vote on adoption to force a weaker definition of aggression than that
which would have been adopted if those states had not participated in the
negotiations." 8
When faced with persistent obstructionism, often the best that
cooperation-minded states can do is threaten to decamp to another institution
with different membership."9 States frequently engage in this kind of forum
shopping, but it is not costless. Establishing a new institution requires political
capital and resources to invest in negotiating the institution's framework
agreement and endowing it with any necessary administrative resources, such as
a secretariat. Moreover, shifting governance to a new institution can be both
politically and legally costly. The political costs can come from a backlash if
116 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 383 (2d ed. 2007); Beth Van Schaack, Negotiaing at the
Inteqface of Power and Law: The Crime of Aggression, 49 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 519-21 (2011)
[hereinafter Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Inteface of Power and Law]; Beth Van Schaack, 'The Grass
That Gets Trampled When Elephants Fight": Will the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?,
15 UCLA J. INT'LL. & FOREIGN AFF. 327 (2010).
117 Id.
118 See Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law, se pra note 116, at 518-21.
119 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 614-19 (2007); Laurence R. Heifer, Regime
Shifting: The IRIPs Agreement and the New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29
YALE. J. INT'L L. 10-24 (2004).
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moving institutions is perceived to be illegitimate. Developing countries, for
example, have pushed back against the shift of intellectual property governance
into the WTO with the TRIPs Agreement."a The legal costs can come if
linkages to other legal rules or institutions are lost. For example, parties to the
Rome Statute cannot easily establish an alternative treaty defining aggression
more strictly. The International Criminal Court would not have jurisdiction over
violations of the stricter definition of aggression, which would prevent
prosecutions-a key goal of parties to the Rome Statute.
Second, institutional bargaining can also limit the issues on the bargaining
table through the jurisdiction of the institution. For example, Article II of the
WTO Agreement, entitled "Scope of the WTO," provides in relevant part that
"[t]he WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct
of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement." '121
Similarly, legislatures might expressly limit an institution's jurisdiction, as the
UNFCCC does in limiting the institution's scope to "greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol." '12 2 It is difficult, however, to cabin off
issues that are within the institution's jurisdiction. Holdout states can take other
issues within the institution's jurisdiction hostage as a way to extract concessions
on the issues they care about. For example, many environmental regimes involve
negotiations over both substantive environmental standards and financial
assistance for developing states. 123 Developing states will frequently insist on
financial assistance as a quid pro quo for agreeing to substantive rules proposed
by developing states. Indeed, they may extract these concessions even when the
substantive standards do not affect them. The Copenhagen and Cancun
Accords, which established a "pledge and review" system whereby states would
make unilateral commitments on greenhouse gas emissions reductions, involved
the creation of the Green Climate Fund to assist developing states in engaging in
clean development. 124 The Green Climate Fund ensured the support of
developing nations, support necessary to eventual adoption of the Accords at
Cancun by the UNFCCC COP.
120 Heifer, supra note 119; Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INT'LI ORG. 277 (2004).
121 WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art 11.1.
122 UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 4.
123 See, for example, UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 11; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 5,
art. 20.
124 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 104, at 708-9 (describing the negotiations over climate finance
generally and the Green Climate Fund specifically).
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Third, and to a lesser extent, institutions also inhibit issue linkages created
by adding new members to an institution or adding new issues. Many
institutions require the permission of the existing membership before a new
member may be admitted. For example, states cannot join the WTO or the E.U.
until the existing membership approves accession.12 A state or coalition within
an institution might have an incentive to block new members, thereby
frustrating attempts to create issue linkages through expanded membership.
Similarly, efforts to expand the issue jurisdiction of an institution can be
frustrated by unwilling members, and acting outside the institution can be
costlier than acting within the institution.
Legislative bargaining thus differs significantly from contractual bargaining
because issue linkages cannot be manipulated as easily, and specifically because
the jurisdiction of a legislative institution cannot easily be narrowed to deal with
holdout problems. Thus, while institutions create economies of scale (in terms
of administrative costs of iterative negotiation) and can ease informational
problems, they can also dramatically complicate negotiations by expanding the
number of states necessary to the adoption of a cooperative program. Voting
rules, of course, can reduce this pressure. But unanimity rules (or vetoes for
particular states, as in the U.N. Security Council) are not uncommon in
international legislatures. If an institution requires unanimity or consensus, as
institutions such as the UNFCCC do, then one state or a small group of states
can prevent lawmaking on an issue unless their demands are satisfied. Even if
only a supermajority is required, a group of like-minded states can still block
lawmaking efforts. Unlike in contractual negotiations, these reluctant members
cannot be removed. Moreover, appeasing them through issue linkages is at least
somewhat more difficult than it might be in contractual negotiations because
making additional issue linkages often requires the consent of the institution's
membership (although the possibility of side agreements among a subset of
members can ameliorate this difficulty). As I explain in Section IV.C, rather than
move wholesale to majoritarian decision-making, international legislatures have
tried to reduce the governance costs imposed by international legislatures
through a series of rules aimed at preserving states' ability to veto action by the
group in certain circumstances, while at the same time permitting states to refuse
themselves to be bound.
Legislative institutions are puzzling, then, because they have the very real
potential to prevent welfare-enhancing transactions. This governance cost is
created by the possibility of opportunism by holdout states. States may hold out
125 See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, art. XII.2; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community provision 57, Dec. 13,
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
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because they are not made better off by the proposed set of rules, or they may
hold out hoping for a larger share of the gains from cooperation. Whatever the
reason, moving to an institution carries a significant cost in that it removes the
threat of expulsion as a check on this kind of opportunism. In other words, it
makes exit a one-way right of the holdout, rather than a right of the group.'26
How do we explain states' decision to give holdouts this kind of power, and
what are the limits on their willingness to do so?
B. The Logic of Holdup
If the conventional wisdom that legislative institutions allow more
flexibility in lawmaking by circumventing consent is incorrect, why do states
nevertheless prefer to bargain within international legislatures? I argue in this
Section that the holdup power created by international legislatures is valuable as
a form of hostage-taking. States face a range of problems in which they negotiate
iteratively. These include environmental treaties in which states negotiate
protocols governing different sources of pollution at different times, as well as
trade agreements in which states negotiate across a range of trade liberalization
issues to be adopted as a "single undertaking" when negotiations on all matters
have concluded. Iterative negotiations are best accomplished through legislatures
because states can use the holdup power created by the institution to enforce
bargains struck during earlier negotiations.
1. Enforcing legislative bargains.
The holdup power created by international legislatures is beneficial to
states because it allows them to enforce two different kinds of bargains. First,
holdup power allows states to enforce what are essentially "vote-trading"
bargains across treaty negotiations when those negotiations do not occur
simultaneously.2 ' Second, it allows states to use bargaining to punish each other
for violations of existing legal obligations. In this way, legislative institutions
support both future lawmaking efforts and provide an institutional foundation
that amplifies the reputational mechanism that drives compliance with much of
international law.
Where legislative bargains or "vote-trading" is concerned, two states might
wish to agree on a coordinated position on negotiations over two different
issues. Although I shall use the term "vote-trading," in reality such agreements
more often involve the adoption of unified negotiating positions across multiple
126 Of course, as noted above, the group retains the ability to move to a different institution,
although doing so has costs. What the group cannot do, though, is use the same institution
without the presence of the holdout.
127 Weingast & Marshall, suqpra note 99, at 144.
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issues, including agreeing to vote for the adoption of draft agreements reflecting
those positions. For example, State A might agree to take a less favored position
on Issue 2 in exchange for State B agreeing to support State A's proposal on
Issue 1. As long as State A (State B) values the difference in the joint negotiating
position on its more important issue, Issue 1 (Issue 2), more than it values the
difference in negotiating position on the issue less important to it, Issue 2 (Issue
1), then this agreement creates "gains from trade.' '128 Each state gets more from
vote-trading than it would by taking its preferred position on an issue-by-issue
basis.
This agreement, however, is subject to transaction costs arising from the
possibility that a state will renege unless the negotiations occur simultaneously.
In simultaneous negotiations, the states each perform their part of the agreement
(taking the less preferred position on the issue that is less important to them) at
the same time, removing fears that a state may back out of its commitments. But
for a variety of reasons, it may not be feasible to conduct simultaneous
negotiations. First, the informational and administrative costs of bargaining
across multiple issues at once might be prohibitive. Second, tackling too many
issues at once might not be politically feasible, particularly where a variety of
other states with different priorities are involved. Third, the state of scientific or
technical research may not be suitably developed on the second issue if, for
example, the issue is an environmental or health issue. For all of these reasons
and more, states might decide to negotiate over some issues now and others
later.
Agreements to swap votes therefore involve the possibility of
opportunism. State A, receiving support on Issue 1 during the first negotiation,
may decide not to support State B during the second negotiation. The credibility
of these commitments can be bolstered by making joint negotiating positions
public. Doing so increases the reputational harm if a state subsequently changes
its negotiating position. And although vote-trading agreements themselves are
not usually legally-binding agreements, a bilateral treaty reflecting the unified
position can have the effect of making it more costly for one of the states to take
a contrary position in a subsequent multilateral negotiation. 129 Doing so without
the first state's consent could mean violating the terms of the bilateral treaty. For
example, the U.S. and Canada are both parties to the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution ("LRTAP"). 30 Under LRTAP's auspices,
two protocols have been negotiated placing limits on sulphur dioxide
128 See ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 145 (2000).
129 Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995 (2012).
130 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 11.
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emissions.131 The U.S. and Canada, however, preferred to work out a joint
position on sulphur dioxide in the context of a bilateral framework, the 1991
U.S.-Canada Bilateral Air Quality Agreement. 32 Both the U.S. and Canada thus
had to ensure that any commitments they made within LRTAP were consistent
with their bilateral agreement if they wished to avoid violating one of the
agreements.'33
Opportunism can also be deterred through ordinary means: retaliation,
reciprocity, and reputational sanctions. But retaliation and reciprocity are often
costly to both states, making their use less likely.'34 Reputational mechanisms, for
their part, only put a thumb on the scale in favor of compliance. 3 Moreover,
weak states may fear that the threat of sanctions of whatever kind will not
constrain powerful states. The sanctions may not be costly to powerful states,
and where negotiations are concerned powerful states may have more or better
alternative cooperative partners available to them. That is, weak states may fear
that in contractual negotiations they might be excluded from future negotiations,
thus narrowing their options to impose sanctions at all.
Shifting governance to a legislature constrains this kind of opportunism in
two ways. First, as discussed above, usually legislatures do not allow states to be
excluded in subsequent negotiations because they present a risk of holding
out.'36 Thus, shifting governance from contractual negotiations to legislative
negotiations ensures states that they will have a seat at the next round of
negotiations. Of course, merely being present would not be sufficient to
guarantee a state the ability to enforce a prior bargain. Therefore, in addition to
guaranteeing voice in a way that cannot be done in contractual negotiations,
international legislatures give states the ability to paralyze an institution.
Consider, by way of example, negotiations to conclude the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), a regional free trade agreement between the U.S., Mexico,
131 Protocol to the 1979 Convention of Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction
of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, July 8, 1985, 27
I.L.M. 707, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215 (1988); Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, June 14, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1540.
132 Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of
Canada on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 678.
133 Indeed, precisely to avoid inconsistent agreements, the U.S. declined to ratify the First Sulphur
Protocol. See HUNTER ET AIL., supra note 104, at 521-31.
134 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAl LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOIciE THEORY
(2008)), available at http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/lO.1093/acprof:oso/97801953055
62.001.0001/acprof 9780195305562.).
135 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theoy of International Law, 90 CAL.. L. REV.
1823 (2002) [hereinafter A Compliance-Based Theogy].
136 There are exceptions. See infra Section V.
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Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Peru, Vietnam, and
Japan. 3 Like other regional free trade agreements, the TPP will cover multiple
areas including "chapters" on trade in goods, trade in services, intellectual
property protection, investment, as well as labor and environmental standards.'38
Like any complicated agreement, negotiations occur over a period of time. As
states finish negotiating particular chapters, the chapter is "closed," meaning that
negotiation will not be permitted further on the chapter.'39 Nevertheless, the
entire agreement must eventually be adopted as a "single undertaking" once
negotiation on all chapters is complete. 4'
States wish to negotiate across all of these issues in a single agreement in
order to benefit from the opportunity to make concessions on a broader range
of issues. Why, though, do states delay enacting the closed chapters? After all,
each chapter could be signed as an individual treaty once it is "closed." Member
states would therefore not need to delay the benefits of cooperating on some
issues while other issues were still being negotiated. The answer-and part of
the logic of the single undertaking, in which "nothing is agreed until all is
agreed"-is to ensure that states that made concessions in chapters negotiated
first are satisfied with the reciprocal concessions they receive in later chapters.
Moreover, the ability to hold up the entire agreement before its adoption ensures
states that they will continue to have leverage to stall the agreement going
forward, even among other states, if they do not receive concessions in the later
rounds of the kind they expect.
A similar logic applies to the second kind of bargain enforced through
legislatures: the substantive legal commitments contained in an agreement (as
opposed to only legislative bargains). States can prevent the adoption of a legal
instrument in retaliation for past violations of substantive commitments. For
example, imagine that the U.S. violates its free trade commitments to China by
erecting unlawful barriers to the entry of Chinese products. China can respond
by preventing the adoption of American proposals within the WTO. Unlike
retaliatory sanctions, such as the imposition of trade barriers, using its holdup
power to retaliate for violations of legal obligations is relatively costless, and thus
an attractive option for aggrieved states.
137 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership, United States Trade
Representative, available at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
138 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/ fact-sheets/2011/november/outines-
trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (last visited Nov. 15, 2013).
139 Deborah Elms, Getting the Trans-Pacfic Partnership Over the Finisb Line, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
AsIAN RESEARCH (Oct. 2012).
140 Id.
Vol. 14 No. 2
From Contract to Legislation
Two key points follow from this insight about the role of legislatures. First,
unanimity or supermajority decision rules in international legislatures-which
are inconsistent with the idea that legislatures are about eliminating the consent
are requirement-are not so puzzling after all. Rules that require consensus or
large supermajorities before a draft agreement can be adopted give states the
ability to hold out precisely and perhaps counter-intuitively to encourage
lawmaking. In other words, requiring large majorities or unanimity gives states
the ability to bargain more effectively across issues. Taking unified negotiating
positions across multiple issues would be difficult in the absence of legislatures
because of the weak mechanisms that exist to enforce vote-trading agreements.
Moving negotiations inside a legislature thus gives a single state or a group of
states (depending on the rules necessary for adoption) what is essentially a
property right over the institution as a whole.141 They can prevent the institution
from moving forward. While this gridlock is costly at the time it occurs, in a
wide range of cases that gridlock will be justified in terms of the gains from trade
it permits in lawmaking efforts.
Second, this theory of international legislatures helps explain how
international institutions enforce international legal obligations, a central concern
of both critics and defenders of international law. International law has long
been understood to rest on a foundation of repeated interactions. 14 2 States are
locked into ongoing relationships with each other, and so violations of
commitments in the present can be punished in the future.1 3 International law
and international relations scholarship for many years understood the
mechanism for this punishment to be the possibility of a reciprocal withdrawal
of benefits or outright retaliation. 1" Reciprocity and retaliation are tactics that
are premised on the present withdrawal of benefits or imposition of sanctions,
respectively, to enforce past bargains. Thus, Antigua might suspend concessions
made under the TRIPs Agreement in reaction to the U.S.'s refusal to allow
Antiguan companies to offer online gambling in the U.S., a violation of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services. 4 More recently, scholars have
focused on how compliance can be driven by reputational considerations. If
states do not honor their commitments in the present, they may not be able to
141 See Weingast & Marshall, supra note 99.
142 ROBERT 0. KiEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POITICAL ECONOMY (1984).
143 Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 135, at 1849.
144 Id.; MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE: POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987).
145 Appellate Body Report, United States Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambing and
Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
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extract concessions from partners in the future. 4 6 The reputational mechanism
for enforcing international obligations is different from reciprocity and
retaliation in that it relies on bargaining over future deals as a way to enforce
past deals. If a state has failed to honor its past commitments, thereby worsening
its reputation for compliance, other states will be unwilling to enter into new
commitments with that state unless the terms are sweetened. 4 '
International legislatures are a way to institutionalize and magnify the
importance of reputational considerations. This observation is significant
because many scholars have worried about whether reputational effects are
significant enough to drive compliance.'48 This concern is amplified where weak
states are concerned. The fear is that weak states have no choice but to accept
the terms offered by powerful states, even if they expect powerful states to fail
to comply with their obligations.'49 Yet legislative institutions are crucial to
enforcing bargains precisely because they allow states to hold future cooperation
hostage in the event of present failures in compliance. They thus greatly amplify
the role of bargaining in enforcing existing transactions.
2. Climate change.
Climate change negotiations within the UNFCCC not only illustrate how
international legislatures can expand the scope of bargaining, but also
demonstrate the danger of paralysis that can result. Like other framework
conventions, the UNFCCC establishes a legislature in the form of the
Conference of the Parties. 5° Like other legislatures, the UNFCCC COP has soft
lawmaking authority, as well as a role to play in the process of hard lawmaking.
The COP's soft lawmaking authority comes from, inter alia, its authority to
"[m]ake recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of
the Convention."'' Decisions of the Parties of the UNFCC taken in the form of
recommendations are not formally binding, but they are soft law by virtue of the
fact that they interpret and implement the binding obligations laid out in the
146 Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 135; Anne E. Sartori, The Might of the Pen: A
Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes, 56 INTl ORG. 121 (2002); but see Rachel
Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, 50 HARv. INT'L L.J. 231 (2009) [hereinafter Brewster,
Unpacking the State's Reputation]; Rachel Brewster, The Limits of Reputation on Compliance, 1 INT'L
THEORY 323 (2009) [hereinafter Brewster, The imits of Reputation on Compliancej.
147 Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 135.
148 Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation, supra note 146; Brewster, The Limits of Reputation on
Compliance, supra note 146.
149 See Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in International Trade Law, 92 VA. L. REv. 251
(2006).
150 UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 7.
151 Id.
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UNFCCC and its related instruments."5 2 The COP also has the power to adopt
protocols, amendments, and annexes to the Convention, often by a
supermajority vote only.'5 3
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol illustrate how international
legislatures can be used both to enforce vote-trading bargains and substantive
obligations. With respect to the first, the UNFCCC reflects at its core a central,
if only partially explicit, bargain: developed states will take action in the short-
term to mitigate climate change while developing states will undertake such
measures (with financial assistance from developed states) in the future."5 4 All
subsequent climate change negotiations have been held hostage to the
willingness of states to block the adoption of measures that do not respect this
agreed framework. On the one hand, countries such as China and India have
used their position to prevent the adoption of measures that might impose
climate mitigation obligations on developing countries. In the absence of the
UNFCCC, one might imagine the E.U., which has shown a willingness to go
alone on climate change, attempting to negotiate regionally or bilaterally with
developing countries on mitigation commitments. But the existence of the
UNFCCC as a legislature allows China and India to discipline developing
countries and block action that smaller developing countries might not be strong
enough to withstand on their own.
155
If legislative governance operates to prevent weaker developing states
from negotiating mitigation commitments, it also operates to put greater
pressure on developed countries to uphold their end of the climate change
bargain. In 2009, a small number of parties to the UNFCCC negotiated the
Copenhagen Accord, a nonbinding instrument that they hoped would be
adopted as a Decision of the Parties and would provide a framework for
152 Technically, protocols have their own COPs, but usually these COPs are the same as the COP of
the framework convention, less any members of the latter that have not ratified the former. See
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change arts. 13, 37
I.L.M. 22, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (adopted Dec. 11, 1997).
153 See UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 15 (authorizing the COP to adopt amendments to the UNFCCC
by three-quarters vote if consensus cannot be obtained); id., art. 16 (authorizing the same
procedure for adoption with respect to annexes), id., art. 17 (authorizing the adoption of
protocols).
154 Compare UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 4.2 (committing developed states to adopt national policies
on the mitigation of climate change) with id., art. 4.1 (requiring all parties, including developing
countries, to inter alia "[tlake climate change considerations into account").
155 See Joost Pauwelyn, The End of Differential Treatment for Developing Countries? Lessons from the Trade and
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emissions reduction after the Kyoto Protocol lapsed in 2012.156 Yet a small
group of states blocked the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord on the grounds
that it did not do enough in terms of developed countries' obligations to
undertake serious mitigation efforts.1"7 Although ultimately unsuccessful-the
Copenhagen Accord was adopted at the next COP meeting in Cancun-these
states were able to delay the adoption of the Copenhagen Accord and put
pressure on developed states to elaborate on its obligations. Perhaps most
tellingly, they were able to enforce the organizers of the Cancun COP to
reinterpret the COP's consensus decision-making rule to mean that a measure
could still pass over the objection of a single member. 58
This gridlock in the climate change regime is a source of extraordinary
frustration. Many commentators have the sense that if either the dichotomy
between developed and developing states could be abolished or if greater
nonconsensual lawmaking were permitted, an effective climate change regime
could be put in place.5 9 This article's analysis, though, suggests that the climate
change regime is functioning as it was intended, and indeed might not exist
absent the grand bargain struck at its inception. Developing states were unlikely
to agree in the early 1990s to a climate change regime in which they were
required to sacrifice their economic development priorities to mitigate
environmental harms caused largely by the historic economic activities of
developed countries. The "common but differentiated" responsibilities
framework at the core of the UNFCCC's tacit bargain was a necessary
compromise. Most importantly for our purposes here, the COP acting as a
legislature has enforced this bargain by preventing renegotiation of its terms
outside of the COP. Instead, developing states have been able to use the COP's
rules on adoption of instruments to keep developed states to the central premise
of the UNFCCC.
Second, the Kyoto Protocol's Compliance Mechanism contemplates using
future bargaining as a tactic to generate present compliance. The Compliance
Mechanism-established by the Marrakesh Accords, a nonbinding decision of
the parties to the Kyoto Protocol-provides that where a state violates its
156 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 15th Session,
December 7-19, 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010).
157 Jean Chemnick & Lisa Friedman, Deal in Cancun Restores Faith in U.N. Climate Process but Many
.Questions Remain, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/13/13
greenwire-deal-in-cancun-restores-faith-in-un-climate-pro-7267.html?pagewanted=afl (noting that
Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Sudan blocked adoption of the Copenhagen Accord).
158 David Bosco, Foreign Poiy: How Mexico Mastered Multilateralism, N.P.R., Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/15/132076505/foreign-policy-how-mexico-mastered-
multilateralism.
159 See, for example, Pauwelyn, supra note 155; Guzman, Against Consent, supra note 6.
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emissions reduction obligations under the Protocol, it shall be penalized by
deducting 1.3 times the amount of excess deductions from that country's
permitted emissions in the commitment period that was to follow the 2008-
2012 period established by the Kyoto Protocol. 6' Because the emissions
reductions obligations for subsequent commitment periods are to be established
by subsequent negotiations, the real effect of this penalty hinges on the
willingness of states to impose the penalty through bargaining procedures. Scott
Barrett has argued that this feature of the compliance system will not work
precisely because states will simply require that their permitted emissions be
increased by the amount of the penalty required by the Marrakesh Accords
before they will agree to any subsequent protocol. 6' While surely a penalty that
hinges on future negotiations is less credible than one that does not, this
particular bargaining mechanism should not simply be judged relative to the
perfect compliance system. Rather, it should be judged relative to the more likely
alternative: a complete lack of a compliance mechanism. Explicit authorization
to use bargaining as a means of penalizing past breaches is an improvement over
a world without penalties.
C. Limiting the Influence of Holdup Power
Legislative governance in international law is thus a form of costly
commitment. It allows states to take negotiations hostage in order to enforce
bargains. International legislatures animate governance not through the
imposition of voting rules calling for less than unanimity; rather, legislative
institutions lubricate international lawmaking precisely because they impose
governance costs in the event that states renege on their agreements.
Nevertheless, states will not go to any length to enforce their bargains. Instead,
they will impose institutional rules that limit the governance costs created by
international legislatures. In this Section I discuss four institutional features
states have developed to limit the costs legislatures impose on bargaining:
(1) fragmentation, (2) safety valves, (3) ratification requirements, and (4) the use
of soft law. Each of these features of legislative governance allows states to
deink issues that otherwise might be linked through legislative jurisdiction,
thereby reducing the possibility of holdouts paralyzing governance across
multiple issues. Of particular note, fragmentation-the creation of multiple
nonhierarchical institutions to deal with related issues-reduces the governance
costs with institutions but raises the coordination costs between linked issues.
160 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 7th Session, art.
15.5(a), Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 Gan. 21, 2002), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a03.pdf.
161 BARRETr, supra note 101, at 386.
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1. Fragmentation.
Perhaps the most prevalent response to the institutional governance costs
imposed by international legislatures is the fragmentation of international law, a
phenomenon in which international regimes frequently make rules in
overlapping areas but lack any hierarchical relationship to each other. I focus
here on the fragmentation of legislative jurisdiction-that is, the division among
institutions over lawmaking authority. Fragmentation is a rational response to
the governance costs imposed by international legislatures because it delinks
lawmaking over two issues that might otherwise be linked. For example, the
harvesting of whale meat is controlled by the International Whaling
Commission, which sets quotas for whale catches, while the trade in whale meat
is governed by the COP to the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES). 62 Rules governing greenhouse gas emissions are
negotiated within the COP to the UNFCCC, unless the greenhouse gases are
also ozone-depleting substances, in which case they are governed by the COP to
the Montreal Protocol.'63 The COP to the UNFCCC also tries to influence
energy consumption by raising the cost of using greenhouse-gas intensive fuels.
A variety of other international legislatures, including the International Energy
Agency (IEA) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
work on this same issue. And of course, probably the most well-known example
of fragmentation is the way in which the WTO deals with (or fails to deal with)
environmental issues raised by its trade rules."6
Legislative fragmentation reduces the ability of states to use the legislative
apparatus to take issues hostage by increasing the costs to linking issues. These
costs arise for several reasons. First, because international legislatures have
jurisdictional limitations, it is costly for states to try to expand beyond that
jurisdictional mandate. For example, in order to try to defeat Proposal 1, a state
might attach Proposal 2 to a package deal, hoping that opponents of Proposal 2
will oppose the package deal in an effort to defeat Proposal 2. Fragmenting
legislative jurisdiction makes this very difficult to do, however, because it may
take Proposal 2 outside of the jurisdiction of the legislature, precluding a
package deal of this kind. Similarly, a state might take a particular issue on which
there is consensus hostage in order to get its way on another issue within the
institution's jurisdiction. To give a more concrete example, OPEC states have
over many years opposed aggressive action to combat climate change within the
162 Compare ICW, supra note 43, art. 5, with Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora, supra note 42.
163 Compare UNFCCC, supra note 2, with Montreal Protocol, supra note 113.
164 See Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the 11TO: The Refinement of W710 Jurisprudence on
EnvironmentalExceptions to GAIT, 24 HARV. ENvTL. L. Ri2v. 563, 564 (2000).
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COP to the UNFCCC. They have done so out of fear that robust rules on
greenhouse gas emissions would negatively impact the oil markets on which they
thrive. Meanwhile, however, the Montreal Protocol has become the most
successful climate change regime in existence. In response to the gridlock with
the UNFCCC, the parties to the Montreal Protocol recently expanded the
Protocol's efforts to control ozone-depleting substances with climate effects.16
Because ozone-depleting substances do not meaningfully affect their economic
interests, OPEC states have no significant objections to reducing ozone
depleting substances through the Montreal Protocol. But if ozone-depleting
substances were within the UNFCCC's jurisdiction, proposals to control them
might well fail because their governance would be tied to the fate of greenhouse
gases.
A similar way in which fragmentation might reduce governance costs is by
committing related issues to institutions with different memberships and
different voting rules. States, of course, can and do coordinate their positions
across institutions, but fragmenting jurisdiction can frustrate efforts to link two
issues across institutions by subjecting the issues to different decision-making
procedures. Different memberships and different voting rules may mean that
while paralysis can occur in one institution, it cannot occur in another
institution. For example, the Montreal Protocol allows adjustments to the
control measures imposed by the treaty to be made by a two-thirds vote, while
the UNFCCC operates by consensus.'66 Thus even if OPEC states wanted to
hold regulation of ozone-depleting substances hostage to regulation of other
greenhouse gases, blocking at least some measures within the Montreal Protocol
would require more votes than would blocking action within the UNFCCC.
Fragmentation is costly to states, however, for the same reason it is a
benefit. By making issue linkages more costly across institutions, fragmentation
may (1) deter valuable issue linkages, and (2) may make coordinating legal rules
across institutions more difficult.
First, jurisdictional limitations and differences in membership and voting
rules can discourage valuable issue linkages as well as harmful ones. States are
masters of the institutions they create and so they can, collectively, expand the
issues within an institution's jurisdiction. They can also use side agreements to
make deals outside of the jurisdiction of a legislative institution. These tools are,
however, limited in their effectiveness. Expanding the jurisdiction of an
institution requires the consent of its members. Many states, though, may refuse
to expand an institution's jurisdiction because they fear the long-term
165 See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 1, 3-5
(2007).
166 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 113, art. 2.
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consequences of placing more issues within a body's control. Benvenisti and
Downs, for example, have argued that powerful states deliberately try to keep
governance within institutions with narrow jurisdiction that they control in order
to prevent weak states from using issue linkages to form coalitions.'67
Fragmentation also imposes significant coordination costs for states across
institutions. Some issues, like energy and climate change, are functionally linked
even if they are not institutionally linked. In other words, policies made on one
issue may have direct effect on behavior relevant to another issue. For example,
a carbon tax might change consumers' energy consumption patterns, linking
climate policy directly to energy markets even if no dejure linkage between the
UNFCCC and energy regimes such as the IEA and OPEC exists. These kinds of
functional linkages put pressure on states to coordinate legal rules across
functionally related issues. Fragmentation may deter coordination, however,
forcing states to choose between competing priorities. The result can be that
states select policies that favor one interest over another interest due to
institutional governance costs, rather than what policy would maximize the
welfare of their citizens.
How do states evaluate these costs and benefits of fragmentation? The lack
of international legislatures with broad jurisdiction suggests that states have a
preference for animating governance within issues over attempting to coordinate
policy across issues. That is, fragmentation seems to be a useful tool for limiting
the risks to international cooperation posed by legislative governance. To return
to the example of energy governance, the fact that multiple international
institutions set rules that influence the price of fossil fuels is a critical source of
coordination costs. Viewing the institutional environment we face today, it may
seem obvious that an institution such as the UNFCCC should be created to deal
with the environmental side effects of energy consumption. After all, domestic
regulatory structures often divide among different agencies direct regulation of
an economic activity and the regulation of its environmental consequences. 6 '
But it is not at all obvious from an initial standpoint that a new institution was
necessary.
Most of the major emitters in the world in 1992 were OECD countries and
therefore members of the International Energy Program (IEP) Agreement,
which created the IEA. A plan to reduce global emissions through binding legal
obligations applicable only to developing countries (in other words, an
agreement very similar to the Kyoto Protocol) could thus have been worked out
through the OECD as an amendment to the IEP Agreement. Such an
167 Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 119, at 610.
168 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Ageny Coordination in Shared Regulatoy Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131,
1134-38 (2012).
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arrangement would have had the benefit of allowing closer coordination
between developed countries' general energy consumption policies and their
climate change-specific efforts.
Instead, nations opted for a U.N. organization open to all states. There are
a number of sensible reasons to have created a new organization to deal with
climate change that is open to all states and operates by consensus. Most
notably, climate change is a problem that affects all nations to one degree or
another, and so universal participation might be thought necessary to confer
legitimacy on the institution. Relatedly, solving the climate change problem in
the long run requires the participation of developing countries, such as China
and India, that are not members of the IEA. Therefore, a climate change regime
based in the OECD might not have seemed a feasible long-term solution due to
participation problem. Finally, the architecture of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol
was based to a large extent on the successful Vienna Convention/Montreal
Protocol framework that governs ozone-depleting substances. Viewing climate
change as an environmental problem and an air pollution problem specifically, it
was perhaps natural to look for examples of successful air pollution institutions
upon which to base the climate change regime.
But part of any decision to create a new organization to deal with climate
change must take into account the effect of bargaining within the institution,
including considerations of its jurisdiction, both in terms of membership and
issues and its procedural rules. Nations regularly negotiate global accords in
bodies that do not include all possible members. Indeed, not infrequently
institutions exclude states that are especially important to the issue on which
states are trying to negotiate rules. Negotiations are done this way precisely to
influence the bargaining process by removing potential holdouts. The OECD
has several times tried to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment, for
example, precisely because doing so within the OECD allows member states to
present other states with a take-it-or-leave-it offer.'6 9 The E.U. and WTO have
expanded in similar fashion. So there is no particular reason that the IEP
Agreement could not have been used as a vehicle to negotiate a climate change
regime nested within a broader energy institution. Indeed, there are calls for the
IEA to consider expanding to include non-OECD countries such as India and
China, based purely on the rise of China and India as energy consumers. Linking
climate change to energy consumption within the LEA would thus have
complemented, rather than distorted, the historical pressures on the IEA to
expand.
The decision thus far not to expand the IEA, either in terms of issue
jurisdiction or membership, most likely reflects a preference among IEA
169 Meyer, Codifiing Custom, supra note 129, at 1063-68.
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members to cabin the governance costs posed within the institution at the
expense of the creating greater coordination costs across institutions. Linking
climate change policies to general energy consumption policies would introduce
distributional considerations unique to climate change to broader energy
consumption policies. Most obviously, if the IEA expanded in membership to
include countries like China, it would bring Chinese consumption policies into
conflict with European countries' more restrained consumption policies aimed
at phasing out dependence on oil.
Even if the IEA and the IEP Agreement did not expand their membership,
including binding climate change measures within their ambit could disrupt
cooperation between major energy consumers. As is well-known, the climate
change regime suffers from divisions not only between developed and
developing states, but also among developed states. While the E.U. is eager to
press ahead on climate change measures, the U.S. insists that no deal for legally
binding emissions reduction measures should be struck until China and India are
on board. Introducing this division over climate change measures into the
IEA/IEP Agreement could threaten to embroil cooperation on energy security
with disputes about how best to manage the environmental consequences of
energy consumptions. Thus, even from the standpoint of developed countries,
dividing jurisdiction for energy-related matters between the IEA and the
UNFCCC marks a commitment to delink to a large extent bargaining over
energy consumption measures from bargaining over climate change mitigation.
The cost of coordinating across institutions thus animates governance on energy
security at the expense of possible gains in the climate change regime.
2. Safety valves.
Another tactic states have developed for mitigating the governance costs
imposed by legislative governance is the use of what 1 shall call safety valves.
Safety valves are provisions that permit states to bargain on issues within the
institution's jurisdiction outside of the institution. When faced with stalled
negotiations within an institution, states can use a safety valve to shift
governance to another forum with narrower jurisdiction. By narrowing the
scope of negotiations, states are often able to make progress when negotiations
in an international legislature with broad jurisdiction are hobbled.
Two examples illustrate the point. First, the GATT/WTO authorizes states
to negotiate regional trade agreements (RTAs).17° These agreements can justify
170 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Star. pt. 5, T.1.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; Differential and More Favourable Treatment
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, WTO Doc. No. L/4903 (Nov. 28,
1979), available at http://www.wto.org/enghlsh/docs-e/legaLe/enabling-e.pdf.
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otherwise impermissible discrimination between the products of different
countries.' They have also become increasingly important over the last two
decades as trade negotiations have stalled within the WTO. 2 The WTO
estimates that today 379 RTAs are in force.7 3 RTAs offer states the possibility of
negotiating with fewer parties, thereby reducing the likelihood of holdups. 1 4
They also allow states to design the jurisdiction of the new free trade institution
with limited reference to the jurisdiction of the WTO. Member states are thus
not constrained by the jurisdictional limits on the WTO in deciding which issues
to negotiate over in an RTA. Indeed, many RTAs narrow their territorial
jurisdiction while expanding their issue jurisdiction to include environmental,
labor, and investment provisions outside of the WTO's purview.1
75
A second example is the Basel Convention on the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention).7  Article 11 of the Basel
Convention authorizes parties to negotiate agreements governing trade in
hazardous waste with non-parties provided that such agreements "do not
derogate from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes and
other wastes as required by this Convention."'77 This provision exists as an
exception to the Convention's normal rules forbidding trade in hazardous waste
between parties and non-parties.7 8 The exception primarily operates to permit
the United States to remain outside of the Convention but still trade in
hazardous waste by concluding agreements with parties, including most notably
OECD states."7 9 This kind of safety valve alleviates pressure on the COP to the
Basel Convention by allowing the United States to remain outside of the
institution, rather than putting pressure on the United States to join. Having the
171 See Sara Catherine Smith, Comment, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is There Still a Place for the
World Trade Organization?, 13 TULSA J. COMIP. & INT'I, L. 321, 321-22 (2006).
172 James Thuo Gathii, The Neolberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 WASH. L. Riw. 421, 427
(2011).
173 See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/region
_e.htm (noting that the WTO has been notified of 575 regional trade agreements, 379 of which
are in force).
174 See Chris Brummer, Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A Trade Perspective, 8 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 535, 535 (2008) ("By providing smaller and more accessible venues for negotiations, regional
organizations often make possible a more efficient means of consensus building than that usually
available under multilateral frameworks like the World Trade Organization.").
175 Id.
176 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649.
177 Id. art. 11.
'78 Id. art. 4.5.
179 See HUNTER FT Al,., supra note 104, at 956-57.
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United States in the institution, which has negotiated a range of issues including
stricter limitations on trade in hazardous wastes as well as a liability protocol,
could derail the COP's ability to function. The United States might decide to
join and then become obstructionist. Provisions such as Article 11 allow
possible holdouts a way to remain outside of the institution, thus animating
governance within the institution.8 '
Safety valves are a special case of regime shifting. Regime shifting refers to
a situation in which states shift governance of an issue from one institution to
another institution.181 For example, intellectual property governance has largely
been shifted from the World Intellectual Property Organization to the WTO
under the auspices of the TRIPs Agreement.'82 Safety valves are a special case,
however, because an overarching treaty explicitly authorizes them. They
therefore exist precisely to allow states to negotiate in alternative fora and
therefore, when done consistent with the terms of that authorization, do not
create the kinds of tensions that can emerge when states simply decamp from
one institution to establish a rival.
3. Ratification and soft law.
Another way states can mitigate institutional governance costs is through
the use of ex post ratification requirements or by giving states the ability to opt
out of a specific legal obligation. Generally, this procedure allows a majority or
supermajority of states to adopt a set of rules within an institution, but either
requires each state individually to ratify the instrument or provides each state
with an opportunity to escape being bound by objecting. The
framework/protocol agreement model, such as has been used for the ozone and
climate regimes, follows the former model. 83 Members of the framework
convention, for example either the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer or the UNFCCC, vote to determine whether the COP will adopt
protocols. The protocols themselves do not become binding on individual states
unless they ratify the protocol.'84 The latter model is followed by institutions
such as the International Whaling Commission (1WC). Member states have an
180 Admittedly, this ability comes at a cost. The purpose of the ban between trade in parties and non-
parties is precisely to encourage states to join the treaty. Art. 11 only permits trade between
parties and non-parties pursuant to an agreement with similar environmental standards, but
nevertheless one might worry that Art. 11 defeats the purpose of Basel's trade limitations.
181 See Heifer, supra note 119 at 14.
182 Id. at 18.
183 See supra Section IV.B.2.
184 See supra Section II.B.
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opportunity to avoid being bound by the IWC's decisions by objecting to the
rule within ninety days from its promulgation. 8 '
Scholars have tended to treat ex post ratification of majoritarian decision-
making as a backdoor requirement for unanimity. 8 ' But this conflation of ex
post ratification with unanimity fails to appreciate the distinction between
contractual negotiations and legislative negotiations. Ex post ratification
requirements in legislative treaties assure states that they need not be bound by a
treaty whose adoption they have allowed. In this way, ex post ratification
requirements recreate the consent requirement of contractual negotiations, but
they also allow states to vote for a measure's adoption without having to accept
obligations contained therein. This freedom is critical because it divorces a
state's own calculus about ratification from its decision as to whether to hold up
the institution. Because states know they need not be bound by rules they find
objectionable, states that do not intend to ratify a measure can allow
cooperation-minded states to use the institution to negotiate rules. Paralyzing
dissent is therefore confined to situations in which states are sincerely using the
ability to holdout as a negotiating tactic or to punish noncompliance.
Put differently, the ex post ratification requirement facilitates legislative
governance by narrowly tailoring the incentives to hold up an institution to
those situations in which the hold up power is being exercised for its intended
purpose. And by narrowly tailoring the incentives to use this hold up power,
rules on ex post ratification thereby encourage the greater formation of
legislative institutions. Ex post ratification, in other words, is critical to obtaining
the benefits of international legislatures-the ability to bargain more effectively
within institutions. Seen in this light, concerns that international legislatures are
insufficiendy nonconsensual because they still require states to individually ratify
an agreement before being bound (or give them the option to opt out) take on a
different hue. Ratification requirements (or opt-out provisions) animate
governance by reducing the incentives to be obstructionist during negotiations
and voting on adoption of a legal instrument.
185 ICW, supra note 43, art. V, 3. The persistent objector doctrine in customary international law
(CIL) might also be justified on these grounds. Although CIL is theoretically consensual, no
affirmative act of state consent is necessary for a state to be bound by a rule of CIL. See JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, A THEORY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1998). CIL
is thus importantly different from ad hoc treaty negotiations in the way in which legal rules are
made. The persistent objector doctrine makes the process of CIL formation something more akin
to the negotiation of a treaty within an institution. While affirmative consensus is removed as the
rule of decision, there remains the opportunity to opt out.
186 Heifer, Non-Consensual Lawmaking, supra note 6, at 85; see also Michael J. Gilligan, The Transaction
Costs Approach to International Institutions, POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN
WORLD POLITICS: RFSI.ARCH FRONTIERS 50 .(Helen V. Milner & Andrew Moravcsik eds. 2009).
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A related tactic states can use is soft law decision-making. Soft law
decisions are not subject to ratification by the parties, and therefore deprive
states of the individual ability to opt out of a commitment.187 At the same time,
violations of soft law rules are not subject to the same kind of sanctions as
violations of hard law rules. 88 Therefore, the decision to cast a COP's decision
as soft law may reduce opposition to it among states whose primary concern is
not bargaining, but rather their own ability to comply in the future.
V. EXCLUSION CLAUSES
The logic of international legislative governance pushes states towards
increasingly institutionalizing governance on a small scale. States rationally
choose to commit international governance to institutions with narrow
jurisdiction to allow limited forms of hostage-taking. But states then face a
quandary. On the one hand, the inability to delink issues in legislative
governance puts pressure on institutions to make ever-greater linkages,
increasing the internal governance costs imposed by institutions until many
institutions, such as the WTO and the UNFCCC, collapse under their own
weight. On the other hand, they cannot coordinate policies effectively across
institutions. In this Section, I offer a solution to this dilemma: international
legislatures should have the ability to suspend the participation of a reluctant
member or expel a member entirely in narrowly defined circumstances. I refer to
clauses authorizing suspension or expulsion as exclusion clauses because they
authorize a legislative body, in particular circumstances, to exclude one or more
of its members from voting. Below, I explain how the logic of exclusion clauses
can invigorate international legislative lawmaking, and I discuss how such clauses
might be drafted. I then discuss a limited form of exclusion clause that already
exists, so-called democracy clauses.
A. The Logic of Exclusion
The logic of exclusion is relatively straightforward. In collective decision-
making, the identities and preferences of member states, in addition to the
decision rule, matter. Consider by way of example the North American Free
Trade Commission, composed of representatives from the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. Pursuant to Article 1131 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade Commission can by a unanimous
vote issue "interpretative notes" clarifying (and therefore possibly changing) the
187 See supra Section I.B.
188 Guzman & Meyer, supra note 27, at 177 ("The key distinction between hard and soft law is that
the former imposes greater costs on the violating state than does the latter.").
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meaning of NAFTA rules.189 In 2001, the Free Trade Commission issued a note
clarifying that the standard of protection afforded investors under NAFTA
Chapter 11 is equivalent to the minimum standard of treatment under customary
international law, rather than the higher standard that a NAFTA arbitration
tribunal had applied in the Metalclad decision. 9' The three states were able to
agree to this rule change because their preferences were closely aligned-in part
because each state stood to be a respondent in investor-state arbitrations
brought under NAFTA.' 91 Imagine, though, that one state had wanted the
higher standard of protection for investors applied, perhaps because it had little
foreign investment within its own borders and thus was unlikely to be a
respondent. Under the Free Trade Commission's voting rules, the outlying
preferences of a single state would defeat a change in the rules.1 92
The ability to exclude the outlying state from the decision-making process
solves this problem. If two states are able to make the decision on behalf of the
institution by excluding the third from the decision-making process, they can
effectively present the third state with a take-it-or-leave it offer. The third state
(or coalition of states, in a broader multilateral institution) can either stay within
the institution subject to the changed rules or they can depart. But they can no
longer as easily block change within the institution. Exclusion thus offers the
possibility of animating international lawmaking by selectively removing the
holdup power of outliers and persistent dissenters.
Suspending the holdout's rights to vote allows the institution to enact
measures favored by its remaining members. By suspending the recalcitrant
member, states are therefore able to get the benefits of legislatures-both the
administrative and informational advantages, as well as the ability to use
legislative institutions to enforce bargains-while taking a greater number of
actions that improve overall welfare. More generally, the selection of cooperative
policies is not as beholden to outliers. The threat of an exclusion vote, for
example, might deter states seeking to profit from holding out. Legislative
189 See NAFTA, supra note 50, arts. 1131(2), 2001; see also Meyer, Codiying Custom, supra note 129, at
1015 (arguing that "clarifying" rules usually involves changing the rules, with associated
distributive consequences).
190 NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n [FTC], Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31,
2001 available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH1 1understanding-e.asp (last
visited Nov. 12, 2013); see also Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Note, Transpareng: An Analysis of an
Evolving Fundamental Princple in International Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 579, 605-16 (2006)
(discussing the Metaklad decision and the subsequent effects of the FTC's interpretative note).
191 See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FIA Investment Provisions: From NAFIA to the United States-
Chile Free TradeAgreement, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 679, 715 (2003).
192 NAFITA, supra note 50, art. 2001(4) (providing that all decisions of the Free Trade Commission
shall be taken by consensus unless the parties decide otherwise).
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policies would thus come much closer to the policies preferred by the
mainstream members of the legislative body.
The idea of "excluding" states from international institutions-or more
generally of excluding members of a legislative body from voting in accordance
with an institution's rules-may seem outlandish and undemocratic.'93 The
practice of excluding states from the decision-making processes of institutions
that nevertheless affect them, however, is quite common in international
governance. Normally, though, exclusion is used at an inslitution-wide level, rather
than within an institution at an issue-specific level. In other words, states are
regularly excluded from institutions entirely until such point that their joining the
institution does not disrupt the institution's decision-making processes. Under
this logic, a group of states creates the institution and its rules, and then other
states join and accept the institution's existing rules. These later-joining states
lack the ability to influence the laws governing their conduct that the founding
members of an institution enjoyed; indeed, they are often excluded from the
founding coalition for precisely this reason! Moreover, exclusion has also been
shown to deepen cooperation among states. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom have
shown that sequential accession to multilateral institutions can lead to stricter
legal rules as measured against an institution that has universal membership from
the outset.
94
This process of sequential accession, in which states join existing
institutions without having the ability to negotiate their rules, has been used to
build institutions such as the GATT/WTO 195 and the European Union. 196
Currently, negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership have proceeded
similarly, with countries such as Japan admitted to negotiations only after a
number of major issues have been resolved. 97 Similarly, during the 1990s,
negotiations over a Multilateral Agreement on Investment took place within the
193 \Vhether it is "undemocratic" depends on what one means by the term. If one means that a state
can have its ability to control its own obligations reduced through a procedure in which its
participation is limited, then it may be undemocratic. On another view, however, allowing
holdouts to defeat the will of a large majority of states is "undemocratic."
194 George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Peter N. Barsoom, Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism,
52 INT'L ORG. 397, 405 (1998).
195 See WTO, How to Become a Member of the WIVT, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto.e/acce/
acces-e.htm (explaining that countries seeking to accede to the \VTO must agree to terms and
conditions which include "commitments to observe WTO rules").
196 Downs, et al., supra note 69, at 414.
197 See Interview by Mohammed Aly Sergie with Mireya Solis, senior fellow at the Brookings Center
for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Japan Boosts the Trans-Pacific Partnership, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/japan/japan-boosts-trans-pacific-partnership/
p 3 12 0 6 (stating that Japan was admitted to TPP negotiations after "most technical aspects of the
agreement" were completed).
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OECD. The hope was that the OECD's membership, consisting of capital-
exporting countries, would be able to negotiate a multilateral agreement among
themselves that non-OECD capital-importing countries would later have to
accept as afait accomp/i.9 '
Thus, the concept of exclusion is not new in international governance.
With a notable exception I discuss below, most such exclusion has been
institution-wide exclusion rather than issue-specific exclusion.99 Issue-specific
exclusion, however, is quite common in domestic legislatures. Perhaps its most
common forms are legislative override provisions that authorize a change in the
normal procedural rules used to make laws in order to eliminate a veto point.200
Usually, but not always, override provisions substitute extraordinary but more
concentrated support among a proposal's supporters for the broader support
ordinarily required. The most famous example of such an override provision is
Article 1, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution permitting two-thirds of each House
of Congress to override the President's veto. 21  The override provision
effectively excludes the President from the lawmaking process in which he
ordinarily participates by eliminating the requirement that he consent to a law's
passage. The Constitution substitutes supermajority support in two of the three
institutions normally required for consent to a law's passage for majority consent
among all three institutions.
Other kinds of override rules exist, not all of which require formally greater
numerical support to override dissenters. The filibuster rules in the U.S. Senate
grant a determined block of forty-one senators (41 percent of the institution's
membership) the ability to block a proposal favored by the majority.2 In
response to the widespread use of the filibuster to delay presidential
nominations, most notably of judges, the Senate recently changed the filibuster
rules through a simple majority vote.20 3 Such a change is made possible by Senate
rules that allow a simple majority to determine procedural rules in the Senate,
198 See Meyer, Codifying Custom, supra note 129, at 1059.
199 See infra Section V.B.
200 One can think of override provisions as a subset of exclusion clauses. Override provisions would
be those kinds of exclusion clauses that require that a particular procedure fail before the override
procedures can be used to exclude a dissenter. For example, Congress cannot override the
President's veto until after the President has vetoed a bill.
201 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
202 F.H. Buckley, The Efident Secret: How Ametica Nearly Adopted a Parliamentay System, and Why It
Should Have Done So, 1 BRIT.J. Arm. LEGAL STUD. 349, 355 (2012).
203 Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, November 22,
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including rules on filibustering."N In other words, Senate rules allowing it to
determine its own procedures by a simple majority vote act as an override
provision, increasing the opposition needed to defeat a proposal from 41
percent to 50 percent plus one.20 5
The ability to change filibuster rules in the Senate-and the fact that the
filibuster rules have not been changed-highlights another important point
about exclusion clauses. Whatever the formal rules that exist for deploying
exclusion clauses, about which I will say more below, the use of exclusion
clauses is also constrained by political factors. Norms of reciprocity that exist in
long-term relationships between legislators, political parties, and in the case of
international law, states, will often mean that exclusion clauses will not be used
on a particular issue even when the necessary number of states has preferences
that would otherwise permit exclusion. However, the possibility that they might
be invoked facilitates bargaining between factions that might otherwise become
entrenched in their positions. The threat of exclusion is, in other words, at least
as important as exclusion itself.
B. Drafting Exclusion Clauses
How, then, would states import exclusion into institutions, such that states
can be excluded from decisions on specific issues without being entirely
excluded from the institution? In this Section, I first discuss possible variations
before considering practical considerations that limit what kinds of exclusion
clauses states are likely to accept.
At a general level, the most likely possibility would be that states would be
able to introduce a decision of the parties that allowed them to temporarily
suspend the voting rights of another member state. 26 The measure would be
subject to a vote. One can imagine a number of different variations on what
precisely the clause would require. For example, the vote might require a
supermajority to pass, or perhaps even unanimous support among states other
than the target of the measure. Exclusion clauses would also have to define the
scope of an exclusion action. Such clauses might be broad, meaning that a state
204 See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & VALERIE H-EITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41342,
PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE OPERATION OF CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 5 (2013) available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/niisc/R41342.pdf.
205 Technically, the percent needed to defeat a bill does not rise all the way to 51 percent because in
the event of a fifty-fifty tie in the Senate, defeating the bill would require the vote of the Vice
President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 51 out of 101 is slightly less than 51 percent.
206 Many treaties defer to the COP the decision on the adoption of rules of procedure but do
stipulate voting rules in the treaty. Exclusion clauses would therefore in most cases have to be
included in the treaty itself, rather than deferred to the rules of procedure adopted by the
legislature.
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can be excluded for a period of time or from a range of issues by a single
decision of the parties. As discussed below, violation of MERCOSUR's
democracy clause, which guarantees that member states will have a democratic
form of government, can be and has been the basis of indefinite suspension
from all manner of participation in the organization's decision-making.2"7 On the
other hand, a narrow exclusion clause would be limited to a single issue or a
particular pending proposal. Congress' ability to override the President is a
narrow provision, insofar as it is limited to a defined bill that the President has
already vetoed. In extreme cases, in which a state has been a persistent
roadblock to lawmaking, an exclusion clause might authorize outright expulsion.
Procedurally, an exclusion clause might require a trigger event before it can
be activated. For example, an exclusion clause might require that a particular
state vote against a measure, say, three times before the clause can be used
against it. This kind of exclusion clause is really an override clause akin to the
U.S. Congress's ability to override the President's veto. The target is not entirely
excluded from the voting process; rather, the voting rules specify in advance that
in a later stage of voting on a proposal the rules may be changed to eliminate the
effect of a negative vote cast in earlier voting. Alternatively, an exclusion clause
might be introduced without any predicate events being required. In such cases,
the governing coalition denies the dissenters the right to cast a negative vote in
the first place. Exclusion clauses might also mandate a "cooling off" period,
requiring parties to attempt in good faith for a certain period of time to negotiate
with the dissenting state. Although one can of course imagine exclusion clauses
that do not require a cooling off period, such clauses are commonly included in
treaties as a precursor to initiating formal dispute resolution.2 8
While in principle there are many potential variations between possible
exclusion clauses, they need to satisfy two conditions to be both practical and
useful. These conditions place limits on what exclusion clauses can look like and
the situations in which they can be used. First, exclusion clauses need to be
incentive-compatible, meaning that states individually prefer to join an
institution with an exclusion clause than remain outside it. Second, the exclusion
clause must be credible, in the sense that states can plausibly threaten to invoke
it in at least some circumstances. I discuss each of these conditions and their
ramifications in turn.
The logic of exclusion outlined above suggests that at least in some
instances exclusion can improve overall welfare by allowing legislatures in
limited circumstances to eliminate the holdout power of particular states.
207 See infra Section V.C.
208 Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Wailing Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the
Road, 5 J. WORILD INV. & TRADE 231, 232 (2001).
Winter 2014
Mgyer
Chicago Journal of International Law
Exclusion, in effect, moderates some of the negative side effects of the holdup
power that legislatures are deliberately designed to create. In order for states to
adopt exclusion clauses, however, such clauses must not only increase overall
welfare. They must also increase individual welfare or, in other words, they must
be incentive-compatible. If a state is not made individually better off by joining
an institution, it will not do so no matter how significant the gains to the general
welfare may be.
This condition suggests several important ramifications for when and how
exclusion clauses should be drafted. First, it suggests that exclusion clauses
should be extraordinary remedies. Put differently, the ex ante probability that an
exclusion clause will be used at all (and therefore against any particular state)
should be low. The rationale for this limitation is two-fold. On the one hand, as
the probability of exclusion clauses being used against it increases, each state's
individual utility from joining an institution declines. However, this decline in
individual utility is offset by making the international legislature more effective,
thereby allowing welfare-enhancing changes to the law. The question is therefore
whether the marginal benefit to an individual state of increasing the ability of a
legislature to act outweighs the marginal cost of it being more likely that a state
will be excluded.
There are good reasons to think that the marginal costs of exclusion rise
faster than the marginal benefits from more effective governance. As exclusion
rules become easier to use, they start to become indistinguishable in effect from
voting rules that allow majoritarian or super-majoritarian voting. States do not,
after all, need exclusion rules if they wish to have the power to regularly override
outliers. Majority or supermajority voting rules allow a large coalition to impose
their will on dissenters without needing to invoke fancier procedures.
Significantly, however, such rules are rarely authorized in institutions entitled to
make binding rules, although they are authorized more frequently where
institutions make soft law rules.2"9 This is consistent with the fact that, as I have
argued, legislatures are more about creating holdup power than removing it. Their
value is in facilitating bargaining through an exchange of hostages, so to speak,
rather than through their ability to facilitate nonconsensual decision-making.
International legislatures thus need a mechanism that preserves the holdout
power that legislatures are designed to create while providing an extraordinary
remedy in cases in which legislative gridlock threatens major global priorities
shared by large numbers of states.
Second, no state should believe itself to be disproportionately likely to be a
target of exclusion-what I refer to as the "neutrality principle." In other words,
the ex ante probability that an exclusion clause will be used against a particular
209 See supra Section II.A.
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state should be spread evenly among states. If a state is reasonably certain an
exclusion clause will be used against it, the state will be unwilling to join the
institution. In these situations, an exclusion clause simply redistributes the gains
of cooperating within the institution from the likely target of exclusion to other
states. A neutrality principle that dictates that no state be an obvious candidate
for exclusion can guide both the situations in which they are deployed and how
exclusion clauses are drafted.
Most obviously, the neutrality principle makes exclusion clauses much
more viable in contexts in which it is not immediately obvious which states will
be the target of exclusion votes. Certain kinds of agreements may therefore not
be good candidates for exclusion clauses. Consider the effect of including an
exclusion clause in the UNFCCC. Suppose that overall global welfare would
increase if nations agreed on a set of international rules governing climate
change mitigation efforts. The gains from climate change mitigation outstrip the
losses. Certain countries, however, might stand to suffer reduced welfare from
such a plan (China and India, for example, which are industrializing rapidly, or
Russia, which will be able to access additional mineral resources currently under
permafrost in Siberia if the climate warms sufficiently). These countries would
not join a climate change institution if they could predict that, upon joining, a set
of rules that hurt them would be implemented and applied to them. This point is
general: states must benefit in expectation from joining an institution before they
will do so. Exclusion clauses have the potential in certain circumstances to
reduce, in expectation, the welfare of states that are likely targets of exclusion. If
their expected gains from joining the institution become negative because of
how they anticipate an exclusion clause will be used, they will not join. For
example, whaling nations like Japan, Norway, and Iceland might object to an
exclusion clause in the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling,
reasoning that anti-whaling nations would use it to disqualify them from votes
on whether to maintain the existing moratorium on commercial whaling.
Exclusion clauses may also be more palatable to states in institutions with
broad jurisdiction. In such institutions, states can more easily bargain across
issues. Broad jurisdiction may thus ease the concerns of a likely candidate for
exclusion by providing it with diplomatic tools and bargaining power it can use
to reduce the probability it ever actually becomes an exclusion target. States that
are potential targets of exclusion votes on one issue can therefore use the threat
of reciprocal exclusion votes on other issues, and the promise of concessions on
other issues, to neutralize the threat. Broad jurisdiction is a double-edged sword,
of course. Neutralizing the threat that exclusion clauses will be used decreases
the clauses' value, assuming a clause is included in an agreement. But it may
increase the clauses' value ex ante by inducing states to sign up.
Similarly, states will be more likely to accept exclusion clauses when an
institution's other members include allies. Allies increase the likelihood that
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states will be able to use politics and diplomacy to protect themselves from
exclusion votes. For example, organizations such as the IEA have mulled
whether states such as China and India should be offered membership."0 If the
IEA had an exclusion clause that, say, required a unanimous vote of all states
other than the target state, however, membership for only China or India might
not be that attractive. Membership for both might be more attractive to each,
though. Either would be able to veto an exclusion vote against the other.211
This last example also underscores how the neutrality principle can be
respected through drafting even when a state is a likely target of exclusion.
Voting rules requiring large supermajorities or even unanimity among states
other than the target state make diplomatic tools more effective at defusing the
risk of exclusion. In the case of a unanimity rule, a state need only get a single
ally to protect it. Such voting rules reduce the probability that an exclusion
clause will be used, thereby increasing its palatability. Incorporating procedural
triggers into an exclusion clause can also protect likely targets. For example, a
clause might provide that a state can vote against a particular measure three
times before it can be the subject of an exclusion vote, and the state can only be
excluded on the exact same measure it has voted against. As with override votes
in Congress, such a provision limits the scope of an exclusion vote. It also makes
the likelihood of an exclusion vote lower by imposing procedural hurdles that
other states may not be able to overcome.
These conditions, to be sure, reduce the effectiveness of exclusion clauses
as tools to eliminate holdouts. In part, the incentive-compatibility condition
mandates this result. A second-best alternative may in reality be the only feasible
alternative, given that states have to consent to the institution and the exclusion
clause in the first place. In this sense, exclusion clauses might be analogized to
escape clauses, such as those that exist in the GATT/WTO.2 12 Escape clauses
authorize a state to depart from its legal obligations in specified circumstances.213
These clauses are puzzling because they reduce the overall welfare of states by
allowing states to unilaterally violate their substantive commitments.2 4 Alan
Sykes, however, has shown that escape clauses are necessary for domestic
210 Shubham Shivang & Utpal Bhaskar, IEA Keen on India Becoming a Member, LIVitMINT, Oct. 18,
2012, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/FfBlbsauEdVMR4UOWx9OfK/International-Energy-
Agency-keen-on-India-becoming-a-member.html.
211 India and China are not in general allies and are at times rivals on the geopolitical stage. In the
context of the lEA, however, they would be natural allies as developing countries in an
organization with members that are predominantly developed states.
212 GATr, supra note 170, art. XIX(1)(a).
213 See Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GAT f"Escape Clause" with
Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 255-56 (1991).
214 Id.
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governments to have the proper incentives to join an institution. Like the limits
on exclusion clauses, escape clauses increase welfare by inducing states to join an
institution, even though they reduce welfare conditional on a state having already
joined the institution.21
Despite the necessity of limiting the use of exclusion clauses, especially to
respect the neutrality principle, to be effective at all, the threat that an exclusion
clause will be used in at least some circumstances must be credible if an
exclusion clause is to add value. I focus on the threat of exclusion because it is
not necessary that an exclusion clause ever actually be used. Often the threat of
exclusion may facilitate bargaining with a holdout.
This "credibility" condition highlights the importance of two aspects of
exclusion clauses already referenced: (1) exclusion clauses should be narrow in
scope, and (2) exclusion clauses should include procedural triggers making
exclusion mandatory in some circumstances.
Narrowing the scope of exclusion clauses reduces the stakes of being
excluded, thereby increasing the credibility of the threat to exclude. For example,
a threat to entirely exclude a country like India from all decision-making at the
WTO because it is an obstacle to negotiating a WTO agreement on investment
is incredible. The cost to India of being completely excluded from all decisions
would be quite high, and India might well be inclined to respond by leaving the
WTO entirely. India's participation in the WTO is too valuable to other
countries to risk over an isolated issue. Total exclusion, therefore, is an
incredible threat because the costs of following through on the threat are greater
than the benefits. A narrower exclusion clause, however, might be more credible
because using it is less costly to the target state, and therefore is less likely to
produce retaliatory action by the target that would be costly to the excluding
states. Narrow exclusion clauses might be limited to a particular measure that
has already been defeated or to a single upcoming vote. Exclusion clauses might
be limited by subject matter as well, not applying to particularly sensitive
decisions. For example, exclusion votes might be permissible to make technical
changes to agreements (such as the inclusion of new chemicals in an agreement
like the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants), but not to
make fundamental changes (for example, the kinds of controls required for
listed substances under the Stockholm Convention). Finally, exclusion clauses
could be narrowed temporally. A state might, for example, have its voting rights
suspended for a week and then automatically reinstated.
Automatic triggers for exclusion votes might also increase the credibility of
the threat. Purely discretionary mechanisms-exclusion clauses that make
215 [d. at 281-82.
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exclusion votes entirely optional-suffer from the drawback that states may be
unwilling to take the initial step of calling for an exclusion vote. States may be
reluctant to force a confrontation and therefore an exclusionary clause may lose
its teeth. Automatic procedural triggers requiring an exclusion vote to be held
force the vote to occur. For example, a treaty might provide that in the event a
state votes against a measure in, say, four consecutive legislative sessions, that
automatically triggers a vote by the remaining members on whether to exclude
the holdout.216 To be sure, states may still seek to avoid confrontation by voting
against exclusion. But automatic triggers can at least reduce the procedural
hurdles to a vote occurring, thereby marginally increasing the credibility of the
threat of exclusion.
Finally, it is worth considering some objections to the idea of exclusion
clauses. First, one might worry about the opportunistic use of exclusion clauses,
driven by powerful countries, because such use reduces overall welfare. States'
ability to holdout, after all, is a device used for their protection to ensure that
they have consented to matters that affect them. For the reasons set forth above,
however, exclusion clauses are likely to be difficult to use, meaning that
opportunistic use of exclusion clauses will be rare. Moreover, exclusion clauses
will likely require large numbers of states to support excluding a single state or
small group. Given the disparities in numbers, in most cases the welfare gains of
the many will outweigh the costs to the few.
Second, one might view exclusion clauses as illegitimate insofar as they
suspend the voting and/or participation rights of states. Exclusion clauses,
however, are not illegitimate so long as they are included in an institution's
constitutive documents, such that all states are on notice of how the provision
will work when they join. In such situations, states have agreed to the exclusion
clauses as simply another procedure available within the institution's governance
structure. When Congress overrides the President's veto of a legislative bill, we
do not say that the President's role has been usurped. Rather, the act of
overriding the veto signals that there is particularly strong support in favor of a
measure, justifying-in accordance with a rule laid down in advance-a
departure from the normal rule that the President must concur in legislation.
In sum, exclusion clauses paradoxically offer the possibility of truly global
governance by allowing institutions to selectively make rules with less than the
216 To really make such a procedure effective, states would also have to have the ability to require a
vote on the matter. Absent the ability to force a vote, a holdout state might be able to block a
measure simply by preventing a vote.
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full participation of their membership. The widespread use of exclusion clauses
would make legislative governance the reverse of contractual governance. In
contractual governance, issue linkages are made selectively while in legislative
governance they are, largely irrevocably, institutionalized. Exclusion clauses
would allow issue linkages to be institutionalized subject to selective delinking in
the interests of facilitating governance. The ability to delink would encourage
states to broaden the jurisdiction of legislatures in order to reduce coordination
costs across institutions. Exclusion clauses would thus address some of the costs
of fragmentation.
Indeed, making exclusion issue-specific within an institution may actually
lift overall inclusion. Member states will be more willing to admit new states if
they know that those states are not going to be able to take the institution
hostage. Additionally, states may be more willing to grant an institution broad
issue jurisdiction if they know that members are not going to be able to hold all
issues within the institution's jurisdiction hostage. In this way, exclusion clauses
may help reduce concerns about fragmentation. As institutional jurisdiction
broadens, states can more easily coordinate policies within a single institution.
The alternative-bargaining across multiple institutions with different voting
rules and different memberships-creates transaction costs sufficiently high that
such coordination among different regimes is unlikely to ever blossom. Put
differently, if legislatures with broad jurisdiction do not emerge because of the
need to temper the costs of holdouts, then exclusion offers an alternative way to
reduce those costs.
C. Democracy Clauses
The notion of exclusion clauses may seem radical. After all, states jealously
guard their ability to control their international legal commitments. One may be
forgiven, therefore, for wondering whether exclusion clauses are a feasible
proposal. Would states really agree to join an organization knowing that the
organization's other members may decide to suspend it for the very purpose of
overriding its dissenting vote?
The answer appears to be "yes." A number of international organizations
already authorize a member's suspension in the event that a member violates (or
in some cases threatens to violate) commitments to the protection of certain
liberal democratic values, most notably a democratic form of government.217
217 There are other examples of treaties authorizing suspension. For example, the U.N. Charter
provides that a member "may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of
membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council" if the
Security Council has taken "preventative or enforcement action" against the member. U.N.
Charter art. 5. Similarly, many constitutive treaties, such as the Constitution of the World Health
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These so-called "democracy clauses" are the closest provision to the kind of
exclusion clauses I propose in this Article. They exist in agreements such as the
Treaty on European Union,218 the Charter of the Organization of American
States, 219 MERCOSUR's Ushuaia Protocol on Democracy, 22' and UNASUR's
Additional Protocol on Democracy. 22
1
Technically, the suspension of privileges that can be imposed under the
democracy clauses flows from a breach of the substantive guarantees of a
democratic government embodied in the democracy clauses.222 However, several
recent uses of democracy clauses highlight how they can be used to solve
bargaining problems, with violations of the democracy clause providing only a
pretext. Most recently, in June 2012 MERCOSUR suspended Paraguay's
participation following the impeachment in a two-day proceeding of Paraguayan
President Fernando Lugo in what was widely perceived to be akin to a coup
d'etat.223 MERCOSUR member states wanted to admit Venezuela as a full
Organization (WHO), provide that members can be suspended for failing to comply with
obligations owned under an organization's founding treaty, especially financial obligations to the
institution. Constitution of the World Health Organization art. 7, July 22, 1946, 62 Star. 2679, 14
U.N.T.S. 185; see also Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, art. V(2),
May 25,1955,7 U.S.T. 2197, T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117.
218 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 7(3), Oct. 26, 2012, O.J. (C 326) 13
[hereinafter TEU] (providing that following violations of the guarantees of democracy and human
rights in the treaty, "the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of
the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including
the voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council").
219 Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, ("Protocol of
Washington"), art. 9, Dec. 14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 1005 ("A Member of the Organization whose
democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the
exercise of the right to participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of
Consultation, the Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the
commissions, working groups and any other bodies established.").
220 Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in the Southern Common Market, the Republic of
Bolivia and the Republic of Chile, arts. 4-5, July 24, 1998, 2177 U.N.T.S. 383 (providing that
violation of the guarantee of democracy may result in the "suspension of the right to participate
in various bodies of the respective integration processes").
221 Additional Protocol to the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR on Commitment to Democracy, art.
4, Nov. 26, 2010, available at http://www.sela.org/attach/258/EDOCS/SRed/2011/06/
T023600004782-0-PROTOCOLTOTHECONSTITUTIVETREATYOFUNASURON
_COMMITMENTTO DEMOCRACY.pdf.
22 See Laurel Paige Purdy, Comment, Warning: Proceed with Caution-A Comparative Analysis of
UNASUR's Democratic Protocol and the Democrag Clauses of the Treay on European Union, 20 TULANE J.
INT'L & CoNiP. L. 277, 291-93 (2011).
"2 James M. Cooper & Carlos Ruffinelli, A Development Model Meets Piray in Paraguay, 43 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 197, 204 (2012); Vladimir Hernandez, Merosur Suspends Paraguay Over Lugo Impeachment,
BBC NEws, June 29, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18636201.
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member of MERCOSUR." 4 Admitting a new member requires the consent of
Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, but the Paraguayan Senate had been
the lone holdout in refusing to admit Venezuela.22 When the Paraguayan Senate
impeached President Lugo, the remaining MERCOSUR members used the
democracy clause to suspend Paraguay's participation in MERCOSUR and then
admitted Venezuela as a full member.26 Enforcing MERCOSUR's democracy
clause thus had the added benefit of solving a bargaining problem that had
persisted since 2006.227
Similarly, in 2000 the E.U. imposed sanctions on Austria following the
inclusion in the government of ministers from the xenophobic Freedom Party.228
In February 2000 the E.U. forbade Austria from meeting with the E.U. at higher
than a technical level and excluded Austria from deliberations on matters that
included the admission to the E.U. of former communist countries bordering
Austria. 229 Following the imposition of sanctions, the Austrian stock market
declined significantly and foreign investors expressed some trepidation about
new investments in the country.23
0
As these examples illustrate, democracy clauses have in practice served at
least two functions. First, sanctions imposed against a country have the effect of
putting pressure on a government to protect the democratic rights of its
citizens. 231 Democracy clauses have been lauded for this role, linking the benefits
224 Bra#d Calls OAS to Consider Mercosur and Unasur Statements on Paraguay, MERCOPRESS, ouly 13,




227 American constitutional history offers a similar example of using exclusionary practices as an end
run around procedural rules designed to slow lawmaking. Following the Civil War, states that had
been part of the Confederacy were required to ratify the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments (after those amendments were passed in Congress without Southern representation)
as conditions for readmittance into the Union. See White v. Hart, 80 U.S. 646, 648 (1871); Wayne
D. Moore, The Fourteenth Amendment's Initial Authorioy: Problems of Constitutional Coherence, 13 Ti-MP.
Poi. & Civ. RTs. L. Rl.;.V. 515, 519-21 (2004); CONG. GiLoBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 453 (1868)
(discussing S.J. Res. 86, which declared the adoption of the fourteenth amendment).
228 Purdy, supra note 222, at 293-94.
229 Id. at 294.
230 See John Tagliabue, International Business; Austrians Consider the Cost of Extremism in the Cabinet, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2000, http:// www.nytimes.com/2000/02/08/business/international -business-
austrians-consider-the-cost-of-extremism-in-the-cabinet.html.
231 See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 220 (2000) (explaining that regimes that impose sanctions on
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of economic integration with the human rights protections a government offers
its own citizens.232
Second, the ability to suspend states' voting and participatory rights gives
the remaining members some control over the identity of negotiators at the
bargaining table. States that select governments with preferences that are too far
from the preferences of the other members of an organization can be
disqualified from participation. Purported violations of the democracy clauses
can serve as a useful pretext to resolve bargaining impasses. As both the
Paraguayan and Austrian situations illustrate, what constitutes a breach of the
democracy clause is somewhat in the eye of the beholder.233 Especially in the
case of Austria, the Freedom Party Ministers at issue were democratically elected
and had taken no action that violated the Treaty on European Union.
2 34
Although overlooked in commentary on democracy clauses, the ultimate
success of democracy clauses in enforcing human rights guarantees likely hinges
on this benefit. Absent this benefit, punishing a state for violations of a
democracy clause may be a net loss for other states. But seen from the
standpoint of bargaining, democracy clauses will be enforced when doing so is in
the interest of states that must negotiate with the violating state. Legislative
institutions thus create incentives for states to monitor each other's democratic
process, a benefit overlooked in the literature on linking human rights and
economic integration.
The potential for democracy clauses to resolve legislative gridlock
nevertheless remains an open question. Democracy clauses are likely not broad
enough to solve all of the bargaining problems that states might wish to solve.
Democracy clauses, after all, require a trigger event related to the breach or risk
of a breach of a commitment to a democratic form of governance and/or
human rights. Whether an event qualifies is not justiciable, and so states have a
232 See Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, In Defense of Democragy, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
283 (2004); Demetrios James Marantis, Human Rights, Democrag, and Development: The European
Community Model, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2 (1994); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United
Nations "Global Compact"for Integrating Human Rzghts into the Law of Wordwide Oganizations: Lessons
from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 621, 623 (2002); Marise Cremona, Human Rights and
Democracy Clauses in the EC's Trade Agreements, 126/127 LAW & JUST.-CHRISTIAN L. REV. 105, 108
(1995); Juliane Kokott & Frank Hoffmeister, Portuguese Republic v. Council. Case C-286/94. 1996
ECR 1-6177. Court of Justice of the European Communities, December 3, 1996, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 292,
294-95 (1998).
233 See Javier El-Hage, Should Paraguay Be Expelled from the OAS, Mercosur and Unasur? AMERICA'S Q.
(June 25, 2012), available at http://www.americasquarterly.org/should-paraguay-be-expelled-from-
the-oas-mercosur-and-unasur?.
234 Purdy, supra note 222, at 295. Art. 7 of the Treaty on European Union does not require a breach
before sanctions can be imposed. Rather, it only requires a determination that there is a "clear risk
of a serious breach." See TEU, supra note 218, art. 7(1).
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great deal of latitude in applying the democracy clauses. But there are still likely
to be many situations in which a holdout has not breached the terms of a
democracy clause even plausibly. In these situations, states are unlikely to invoke
a democracy clause, even pre-textually.
More generally, the set of countries likely to violate democracy clauses and
the set of countries that holdout in a legislative institution may not overlap. For
example, developed countries that have played a role in stalling negotiations in
the Doha Round cannot be plausibly targeted through the use of a democracy
clause. This fact raises two additional and related problems with the use of
democracy clauses. First, democracy clauses will be ineffective against many
developed countries that are liberal democracies but may still prevent welfare-
enhancing negotiations in international legislatures. Second, because of this
disparate impact, countries that are not stable liberal democracies such as China
may object to the use of democracy clauses and refuse to include them in many
multilateral agreements. These countries can easily see that democracy clauses
only benefit stable liberal democracies such as the United States, Canada, and
European countries.
Democracy clauses themselves are thus not likely to provide a solution to
bargaining problems in international organizations. They do, however, indicate
that states are, at least in some circumstances, willing to place their ability to
participate in the hands of other members of their respective organizations.
Democracy clauses may also tell us something about the kinds of conditions that
need to be attached to exclusion clauses to make them palatable to states.
Democracy clauses are usually agreed to by democratic governments that
perceive little cost to themselves in agreeing to the clause. After all, the
democracy clause enlists international organizations in preserving the democratic
form of government in its member states. This observation suggests that
exclusion clauses are more likely to be adopted when they are restrictive and
unlikely, ex ante, to be used against the governments that agree to them. In
short, exclusion clauses exist and are possible under some circumstances.
Greater experimentation will tell us more about the kinds of conditions under
which states might find them acceptable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Multilateral cooperation is critical to resolving many of the world's most
pressing problems: poverty, climate change, and humanitarian crises, to name
but a few. As states have become increasingly interdependent, they have turned
to legislative forms of lawmaking. But international legislatures, to the chagrin of
some, have not eliminated the requirement that states consent before being
bound by legal rules.
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But appearances can be deceiving. International legislatures facilitate
international lawmaking by serving as commitment devices of sorts. The fact
that legislatures are in some ways less flexible than contractual negotiations-
contrary to the conventional wisdom-serves to lubricate bargaining by giving
states a tool to enforce legislative bargains. This need for an enforcement tool
across related negotiations explains the rise of international legislatures in
modern times.
Despite their key role in facilitating legislative bargains, no one can deny
that multilateral lawmaking needs to accelerate if we are to successfully confront
the challenges of the day. The current ennui in multilateral governance calls for
fresh ideas. Many will object to the proposal that states can be suspended or
excluded from international legislatures simply for exercising their right to refuse
to support new legal instruments. But the age of islands of sovereignty, if it ever
existed, is long since past. In today's interconnected world each country is part
of the main. International regimes need to reflect this delicate balance between
the needs of the whole and the needs of the individual. As of yet they do not,
but there is hope.
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